NEW TIMES

The victorious nation rejects dictatorship

September 3–9, 1991

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US: $1.40

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LEONID TISHKOV

A SOVIET WEEKLY

NEW TIMES

No. 35, 1991
Founded 1945

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

Contemporaries' portraits by writer and artist Boris Zhutovsky

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Our address: Pushkin Square, Moscow, GSP, 103782, USSR. Telephones: 229-88-72, 209-07-67

NEW TIMES

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We have correspondents in
Belgrade, Berlin, Bonn, Bucharest, Delhi, London, Mexico, New York, Prague, Pretoria, Rome, Sofia, Stockholm, Tokyo, Vienna, Warsaw

Founders:
New Times journalists

Published in Russian, English, German, and Italian

Printed by
Moskovskaya Pravda
Press. Telex: 411164a newt SU
411164b newt SU
Telefax: 200-42-23, 200-41-92
Advertising Department:
209-92-82

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From our mailbag

■ You published a letter from Stanislaw Leszczynski from Cracow in No 4/91 written in response to Leszek Kolakowski's article on anti-Semitism (no 46/90). Leszczynski says that although there are practically no more Jews left in Poland; anti-Semitism is still alive (apparently in theory, because in practice there is no one to be targeted by it). The letter's author also tells about the decision of the Roman Catholic Church to preach in all Catholic churches against anti-Semitism, which is incompatible with Christianity.

I've always considered the Russian Orthodox Church to be more progressive than the Catholic Church. But somehow I haven't heard anything about similar sermons taking place in this country, although anti-Semitism is very widely spread here and so far it has had many victims. Of late the prestige of the church has grown, and such sermons (including those on TV) would surely find response among the public.

Some 10-15 years ago the Vatican Ecumenical Council passed a decision stating that the Jewish people were not responsible for the Crucifixion of Jesus Christ. When the former professor of the Leningrad Theological Academy Osipov (he resigned from priesthood) was asked why our press kept quiet about that, he answered that the government obviously did not want to spoil its relations with the Arabs. Perhaps now our church is afraid that the government will not approve of such sermons? When Jewish graves were defiled in Paris, President Mitterrand led a demonstration of protest. In Leningrad, too, a similar incident took place several years ago. Why wasn't it censured by the city authorities?

It is apparently thought that there is no anti-Semitism in this country, just as it was believed some time ago that we had no prostitution or drug addicts. We have only anti-Zionism, and the Anti-Zionist Committee of Soviet Public Opinion headed by General Dragunsky. Against whom does it fight?

Leningrad Jews are beginning to learn German instead of Hebrew. Germany is said to be ready to provide shelter to a considerable number of Soviet Jews. Victorious veterans of WWII are also likely to seek shelter in the country they defeated.

Boris Fridman,
disabled war veteran
of labour,
Leningrad

■ No 23 of your magazine caught my eye with the unnatural closeness of two articles headed "Return the sacred possessions to the believes!" and "And what shall be Left for atheists?" which have nothing to do with each other in their contexts.

By tying them together in a way juxtaposed the serious cause of saving monuments of Russian church culture (very serious indeed, which is illustrated by the authoritative signatures) and the superficial attempt to "proclaim" the foundation of a society of free thinkers. To put it mildly, the latter has a very superficial argumentation of the reasons for its foundation and the program of its activity.

But my main objections to the very idea of the society's foundation. **In the present situation there is no need for it!** We must not hinder positive religious influence on the society's moral rebirth. And the "coordination of efforts of all believers and non-believers alike in their struggle..." is an artificial and harmful thing. Just like the all-round setting up of "sections." What comforts me is the confidence that nothing will come out of it.

I. Brazhnik,
a politologist and theologian,
Kiev

■ In a book store in Düsseldorf I saw your magazine. I bought one issue and liked many articles there. Several days later I went back to that store and found another ten numbers of the magazine. Since their price was very reasonable I bought all of them. And that night I stayed up till four o'clock in the morning reading and rereading the edition which was new to me though the issues were old.

I was especially interested in P.Simic's article "An Unknown Tito" (No 42/90). As a worker I am interested in the history of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Communist Party of Germany. Simic's material made me think that German communists helped Stalin and the KGB. That explains why Mielke, Pieck, and Ulbricht occupied leading posts after the purges. I want to gather proof of my assumption. Are there any archives in which one can find corresponding documents? Perhaps they can be found in the archives of Komintern or the KGB? Would any one like to help me?

Bertold Werner
Düsseldorf, Germany

■ I am a permanent reader of *New Times*. Your magazine helped us get a new apartment. I thank you from the bottom of my heart.

When I read your magazine and the central press (I have no TV set) I get very angry with our authorities. Stalin went crazy with the repressions, destroyed true communists and intelligentsia but spared bureaucrats and boors. But Stalin had some merits, too. He left us aircraft, machines, and the atom bomb. Defend yourselves! And he didn't borrow money from anyone. Krushchev went crazy about corn and the United States. He travelled around the world and his motto was: "To cath up with and outstrip America!" The downfall of rural areas began under him. But Khrushchev, too, had his good points. The virgin land. Brezhnev went nuts with chemistry. Everything became chemical – the air, water, earth, and trees. And we all are slowly dying from chemistry. But Brezhnev's achievement was the Baikal-Amur railway. Andropov began to get rid of thieves, who had mushroomed under Brezhnev, but he died too soon without accomplishing the task. Chernenko was old and sick and we couldn't

"That night I stayed up till four o'clock"

Non–religious people are not welcome now

"Our bosses come and go while our life remains difficult and gloomy"

expect much from him. Gorbatchev made a very silly move – he introduced "prohibition." As a result, all vineyards were destroyed and drug-addiction appeared. And how do democratic deputies solve the people's problems? They began to look for mistakes in Lenin's and Marx' works. While our life remains difficult and gloomy.

G. Tarasova
Djambul, USSR

■ I decided to write to your magazine after I read a letter by N. Dolotov from the Ukraine (No 26/91) who tells of the former cemetery of German prisoners of war which has disappeared without a trace.

I accidentally learned about the graves of German war prisoners at the Vsesvyatskoye cemetery in Tula. In 1947 my father, Air Force Colonel Sergei Anuchkin was buried there. When my mother died in 1983 I wanted to bury her near my father but the cemetery authorities refused to do this. During our conversation with the administrator (I don't remember in what connection) he told me that the prisoners of war in the Tula camp had rebelled and our soldiers shot them all dead. Several dozen Germans were buried at that cemetery. And I thought: "What if some soldiers who are thought missing in Germany lie in the Tula soil?" This information may interest the international non-governmental foundation Eternal Memory of Soldiers which sets itself then lofty task of comforting those living by commemorating all the soldiers killed in the war.

Arnold Anuchkin-Timofeyev, Cand. Sc.,
Moscow

■ I was very worried when I read the following lines from the impressive article by Y. Rakhmanova "A night-time chat in a hospital" (No 9/91). In the hospital Rakhmanova heard about a woman who went to the Ukraine to bury her father. Suddenly the bus was stopped, by several men, who entered it and said: "Come out all those who are not local residents, we'll beat you". And they beat the poor woman up. Unfortunately, judging by press reports, such incidents did take place. As a Ukrainian I'd like to express my deepest apologies to this woman and all others who were exposed to such humiliation. But the author shouldn't have left this episode without any commentary, because one gets the impression that all Ukrainians are bandits and nationalists. Hooligans should bear responsibility for their actions. And the attempts to describe such incidents as a manifestation of nationalism only stir up national hatred.

A. Kolesnik
Vinnitsa Region, USSR

■ The author of the article "Burnt-out souls," V. Petrushin, (No 25/91) gives a sociological and psychological analysis of the origin of the totalitarian state and looks for ways to heal our society. It's very timely material.

We've already learned to accuse the revolutionaries, who organized the 1917 coup, of everything in the world including madness. But this is no argument.

The author is right: the statement about ridding oneself of the psychology of a slave does not explain anything. The question arises: how did we acquire this psychology? When did it originate and whose fault is it? It was born under the totalitarian system of feudal serfdom in the Russian Empire, the social and class composition of the state, which was dominated during hundreds of years by petty bourgeois, philistine, slavish psychology. Such a system could not serve as a proper foundation for building socialism, nor, for carrying out a great revolution. Therefore, the society in this country is pseudo-socialist, it's a society of petty bourgeois socialism. And this does not prove that the theory is wrong. The situation in this country is a result of the wrong methods of restructuring the society. This is the core of the problem, it differs from what the author says.

To my mind, the article likewise gives no answer to the question of how to cure the "sick society." Of course, V. Petrushin speaks about granting the citizens personal freedom. But he forgets that one cannot live in a society and be free from society. The author understands freedom in a very abstract way. A sick society can be healed only if it is built anew. A new social system must be constructed, which is impossible within the framework of perestroika. History will show how it will happen, and there's no need to hurry it.

Valeri Pochenko, Cand. Sc. (Phil.,)
Leningrad

■ I've read the response of my countryman D. Miller (No 23/91) to the article by G. Ariyevich "Free press under fire." (No 4/91). "Journalists forget whom they write for," complains D. Miller. And I want to say to that: "Thank God, the journalists have finally remembered whom they must write for." It is for us, – men in the street, for Mezers and Millers, for our children and families, for the deceived and humiliated for the rich and the poor, for soldiers and generals, for cooks and presidents. In a word – for the people. And I am glad that such publications as *New Times* remember us – the oppressed and the fooled.

We are now talking about the former grandeur of the Russian state. But this grandeur is by no means Russian chauvinism, fanned by demagogue Zhirinovski and jingoist Makashov, but rather in the grandeur of the Russian soul, the freedom of thought and its tolerance of and respect for other nations. Journalists write about innocent victims, blood and depravity, about our history. Our press, which is now free, has changed my outlook. D. Miller is wrong to think than we "got tired of the endless marathon along the road of glasnost." I am grateful to this marathon because it made me remember my grandfathers, who disappeared without a trace in the terrible year 1938. One of them defended Soviet power and organized collective farms; and was destroyed, when the state did not need him any more. And the other grandfather – (who, incidentally, lived in the same city with the letter's author) was killed for his faith in god.

I. Mezer
Rybinsk, USSR

Compiled by
Tatiana Chernova

THE WAY I SEE IT

Drawing by Victor Bogorad

THE PUTSCH THAT FAILED

The people repulsed the attack

In this issue the reader will learn what we experienced during the putsch. It is devoted to three young people who were killed during those days, to all who stood on guard round the Russian parliament building, to all those who rose to the defence of freedom and democracy in those crucial days.



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

A land that triumphed over socialism



The country shuddered in nightmarish convulsions and spit out the bone that had stuck in its throat in 1917.

Simon Soloveichik

In this mortal convulsion everything stood on the brink of doom.

Never before had the foe come out so plainly and overweeningly against the people with tanks in the streets, ready to crush men and women, with a curfew imposed, with newspapers shut down, and with the President placed under house arrest in the Crimea. Indeed, after the October fighting in 1917 Moscow had never witnessed an attempted assault before.

And never before had the people risen up in such might to defend freedom.

Six days, with three black and three bright; three days to serfdom and three days to liberty.

An incomplete week! With passions ranging from bewilderment and horror to boldness and daring courage, from timid joy and jubilation to mourning for the killed.

Had any dramatist thought to invent a scenario of this order and to compress it within a six-day limit, that would have been almost impossible. However, history stands forth as the greatest of dramatists of all times and nations. Indeed, of the nation and the time, of the nation within the time. Truth to tell, not all were ordained to witness the tragedy we saw. History is not always so creative.

* * *

That week began at daybreak, as if announced was the onset of a perpetual solar eclipse. As if announced was the ousting of ordinary day and the onset of eternal night. As if according to the edict of the State of Emergency Committee, that day dawn was not to break and the sun was not to rise. We poured out into the streets and saw that that was so, that the sun had not risen, that in its place tanks had rolled into the city. What was most frightening about them, was that they kept engines roaring unscrupulously burning precious fuel and demonstrating that the very next moment they might advance. Where? Against whom?

The new-fangled TV and radio announ-

cers read endlessly the same string of texts. As if the Russian language had stopped, as if its vocabulary had nothing but the words stored in television's electronic memory that were echoed again and again. Again we were told we would hear nothing else, that instead of two or three channels there would be but one, but one choice of words, but one eclipsing force nought else. This was most deftly done, with resistance suppressed not by argument, or speech, but by the monotonous boredom of endless repetition.

When Tsar Nicholas I passed judgement against the Decembrist officers of 1825, he divided them into categories, the first meriting death, the second the chain-gang, etc. etc. The chief conspirators will be condemned according to that first category. But Kravchenko should also be included, regardless of whether he obeyed orders or demonstrated zeal. That is of no importance, as he wrought the most terrible of all evils. He assaulted the countless White Houses of conscience that tower up in every mind and heart. He enveloped the country in a poisonous cloud worse than nerve gas. He did not leave a single chink for light to stream in. To be fair, this by no means villainous looking, smiling man wearing European garb is a topnotch villain and a traitor, as after all said and done the President had specially allotted him the task of upholding the President. But presidential television fired on the President.

Thus far, our land is wonderfully adapted to putsches and coups, to the transfer of power behind the scenes without involving the people. It was enough to press down the one Kravchenko button for all Moscow television broadcasts to flood the country with falsehood. It was enough to dispatch an officer to a printing press for half the newspapers not to come out, send one more officer to another printing press for the other half to stop coming out. There was no need to storm the post and telegraph offices. It was enough to phone there for them to close.

The fate of freedom hung by a thread. Scarcely is it right to say that the conspirators were stupid, that they could not engineer the putsch properly, that a Soviet Pinochet was lacking. No, our Pinochets abided by the rules of the coup game, but their opponents did not. Gorbachev was to have abdicated, as he was in hopeless straits. In a similar plight Khrushchev did abdicate. But Gorbachev acted contrary to the rules and did not; more than that he told the putschists in no uncertain terms to f– off. According to the rules, Yeltsin should have immediately negotiated for a compromise, as after all he is no suicide and definitely has horse sense. But he attacked the new authority and was not afraid to put himself outside the new law that threatened dreadful punishment for incitement to resistance. Who behaves like that? During a putsch people ought to stay at home and not go out of doors, as shooting might begin. Moreover, all rallies and meetings were banned. But what did they do? After all, isn't it utter folly to face tanks with bare hands?



No, the people were crazy: they did not acknowledge any rules even those of the putsch. Yanaev, Pavlov et al have every reason to feel hurt.

***

It was not the stupidity of the conspirators that won out. After all, stupidity may easily be compensated for by vicious determination and cruelty. It does not take a great mind to engineer a putsch. However, in this case the 72-hour regime collapsed not by virtue of stupidity, but due to the grit of the people and their elected servants. Indeed, all for whom the people voted in open direct elections stayed loyal, whether Yeltsin, Popov, Sobchak, Rutskoi or Luzhkov. Of course elections are a knotty affair and at the polling stations votes were cast for Zhirinovsky too. Still the people had the right hunch. Democracy demonstrated its might, its superiority. Direct nation-wide elections represent the best way to organize power.

Unfortunately, the President put his foot wrong. All his choices betrayed him, although he had millions from all over the country to choose from!

But just look at the men he chose. They were not from the millions. All that the personnel reshuffle amounted to was the introduction of a second secretary in place of a first secretary, or a deputy minister in place of a minister. The real personnel reshuffle had nothing to do with the President.

In his speech from the White House balcony, Yeltsin asked the parents of the three boys killed to forgive him, the President, for having failed to protect and take care of their children.

These words will never be forgotten. We are all to blame when we think of the killed and their parents. But who knows how many people would have perished or would have been tortured to death in the Gulag if not for Yeltsin, a man chosen three times by the nation, that is in Supreme Soviet elections, the presidential elections, and the "elections" around the White House when blood was spilled. It is long since that the world has seen such a "casting of votes." Yeltsin proved up to the mark across the board, with not a single wrong gesture or word. Though but recently journalists and sociologists had sought to persuade us that Yeltsin was a nonentity, a populist acting against the state. Yeltsin saved us all. He protected everyone, even those who had attempted to oust him. I can imagine that some of the arrested top executives, who now turn so sensitive an ear to the voice of justice – since no one craves justice so greatly as those criminals who rode roughshod over justice while free – will say that they had no intentions of herding anyone into the Gulag. Is this a matter of intent though? After all, there is the logic of developments. And once an emergency situation is promulgated that means there will be transgressors who would need to be immediately detained, after which all rising to their defence, would likewise be arrested, and after that half the country. Once the Constitution is violated, the killing will crawl in your wake, whether you want that or not.

The lesson taught is that democratic procedure is fantastically important. A dictatorship does not need procedure as it kills without discretion. But democracy is propped up by procedure. What saved the country was the correct drafting of the law on the state of emergency. It was impossible to stage a coup without breaking that law. The putschists at once showed themselves to be putschists. For had there not been a clause in that law stating that a state of emergency could be promulgated only with the permission of the republics or in line with a two-thirds vote in the Union Supreme Soviet, Yanayev's actions could have appeared lawful.

***

Democracy needs to be shielded and protected from every quarter. It must have a threefold, if not fivefold barricade against monopolies: the monopoly of the press, the monopoly of television, the monopoly of the army, and the country's agencies of defence, the monopoly of the economy, in short, every kind of monopoly wherever. Monopoly is the sole true enemy of freedom and democracy. Any attempt to monopolize, even without causing tragic results, must be viewed as a crime, before such results may occur. Monopolization is totalitarianism's lifehood. Why is the Communist Party so dangerous for the people? Not only because it came out for the putschists, which was only to be expected, but also because it still monopolized the reigns of power. We learn that not the putschists, but a CPSU Central Committee Secretary instructed TASS, while Moscow party boss Prokofiev, who thought that

Our woman in the White House

New Times staff contributor, **Veronika Khilchevskaya,** spent three days in the besieged Russian White House

First day

The most difficult mission of the morning of August 19 was to get into the White House. Journalists were ordered to keep away from it. I managed to slip through the police cordons when the policemen's attention was distracted by several athletic-looking young men with neat sports bags slung over their shoulders (later it turned out that they were from the private detective bureau Alex). Four strong young men with walkie-talkies were posted outside the presidential office on the fifth floor. They were friendly to me after I flashed them my *New Times* ID, but they did not allow me to enter the reception room. The clatter of bolts and four-letter words could be heard from behind the door which had no room number on it. Men with assault rifles were coming out of there. I heard a voice saying, "Only two magazines for each. We haven't got any more..."

After some wandering about the floors I finally got to the office of Valentin Sergeyev, who, I later learned, acted as the Representative Plenipotentiary of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Republic. He helped journalists get passes, and when he found out about the Bush statement, he immediately sent me to translate it. In no time his office had turned into a press centre. We spent two days in it, sending information to various newspapers, magazines, TV and radio companies. It turned out that calling Saratov was more difficult than contacting any foreign city. The fax machine worked perfectly, and so did five Moscow telephone channels.

By the day's end the radio station started broadcasting. Late at night we were informed that the basement of the White House and the secret passage to the Moscow metro were mined. It turned out that the elite Tamanskaya and Kantemirovskaya armour divisions were heading for Moscow. The telephones never stopped ringing. At one point I remembered that I should call my relatives...

The most exciting news of the day was that a unit from the Tamanskaya division had switched sides and joined the defenders of the White House. The rest of the night was relatively calm.

Second day

Early on the morning of August 20, at about 4 a.m., we came out into the square. Everything was calm and wet with rain. People were sitting around bonfires. Inexplicably, the scent of mushrooms was heavy in the air.

By 10 a.m., the square outside the White House was one stormy ocean of people. Many familiar faces could be seen in the corridors of the White House: the TV star Molchanov, the popular journalist Borovik, the cellist Rostropovich.

A group of Afghan war veterans came to help. Yeltsin made a speech. There were so many people

---

thanks to the putsch everything would return as before, commanded Vice-Mayor Luzhkov to appear before him. "But I am going to see Yeltsin," Luzhkov retorted.

How these current CPSU Central Committee secretaries let their party down! The beloved Lenin worked hard to build it up, the great Stalin did his best to fortify it, and more generations of führers expanded this stupendous organization. However, the present leaders gambled away the party in 72 hours. What would it have cost it to come out for the people? Just a couple of words, and the party would have flourished for decades to come. But no, that was out of question. It is fascinating even to see how greatly this was out of question, as Lenin had worked so hard, Stalin had fortified it while generations of führers had put their best foot forward to foster such Communist Party entrails for them to be in the right place at the right time for the putschists, and do what they did. All else was out of question.

Anyone may be a communist. Communism or Socialism is what he may believe in. Indeed, he may even believe in the Devil himself. However, a ruling communist, a communist who exercises even a bit of power over the state is dangerous. As I see it, for the time being developments are proceeding in the absolutely correct direction. Communists are not touched, but authority is wrested away from them most resolutely, with the premises they had previously occupied, shut down and sealed off.

Anyone wanting to be a communist, may be that. Let one be whatever one wants to be, but without any right to phone TASS or a factory and issue instructions, without any right to classify even a scrap of paper as something highly confidential. Judgement must be passed against the Communist Party, not for its being a communist party, but for its having clandestinely preserved and propped up the means for monopolization, for having appropriated authority with elements of monopolization. That must be viewed as a criminal offense.

***

Just imagine, Leningrad's Smolny and the Central Committee buildings on Moscow's Staraya Ploshchad have all been shut down and sealed off. Only a week ago we couldn't have imagined even in our wildest dream that that would ever come to pass!

Could it truly be that the curtain has rung down at last? That aboard the legendary *Aurora* the "All Clear" may at last be sounded?

***

Why the junta won out overnight, without a single shot fired, is absolutely understandable. This was because the country was shackled. Only recently it was absolutely what the conspirators sought to attain. As they saw it, they were staging their coup to restore what they believed normal. That roly-poly, which had teetered away from the perpendicular due to the odd temporary democratic changes should have regained its normal upright position and after some wobbling stay leaden put. No wonder all so lightly predicted a coup. When on that night of the 18th I myself said a coup was likely, all I heard was laughter and the remark that I must be afraid.

I, indeed, felt afraid after Alexander Yakovlev's well known statement. Judging by the resolution with which they expelled from the Communist Party its wisest member, judging by the way they rushed things, one realized that Gorbachev would be next. The entire country realized that, except for Gorbachev himself. Our President simply lacks a normal sense of danger, which in his case is perverted. As a result, he does not sense the danger where it really lies and imagines it where it does not. He simply doesn't realize who are his friends and who are his enemies. Such is his mentality. A student friend was Lukyanov, whom he himself chose. Then to chastise him, destiny handed him one more friend – Yanayev. Freed and just back, he immediately appointed Moiseyev acting Defence Minister. We were all disgusted and cursed the incorrigible President. It was his good luck that Moiseyev was quickly replaced.

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

Our President is a man from the apparat. He might be the best of them, but he simply can't understand people. Another example of how he put his foot wrong: indeed, how could he rebuke the press at that very first interview? How could he rebuke people who had risked life to save him?

If not for our free press, if not for that remoulding of the inner man carried on for so many years

around the house that no attack on it seemed likely.

Alarming news started to come at 5 p.m. from the radio station. Fresh tank units were pulling into Moscow.

In the evening, the weary Khasbulatov assembled the deputies and conveyed fresh news to them: "The critical moment has come, he said, "the Tamanskaya division unit that defended us had to pull out under the order from the Defence Minister. We have also received information that helicopter-borne KGB commandos are going to attack us."

By midnight, it became hard to breathe because of the bonfire smoke and mounting tension. Or should I call it fear? Suddenly all the lights went out and we heard the Alex men running in the corridors. All women were requested to leave the building, and I had to hide behind a door. The radio was broadcasting instructions over and over again: "Be calm and vigilant. Don't panic. People around the House, move 50 metres away! If the tanks come, you are to disperse! Those inside the house, position yourself in pairs by windows. No one is to be let inside. KGB commandos may try to infiltrate the house disguised as Yeltsin defenders. If someone tries to break in through the windows and doors, shoot without warning."

Someone suggested that I take off my T-shirt and wet it. In case of a tear gas attack, I was to cover my face with a wet cloth. I went to the toilet in the darkness. A voice called me, "Can't you see it's a men's room, you idiot?" "Try and find the ladies' in this darkness," I snapped back.

My preparations for a gas attack proved useless. Half an hour later we were given real gas masks and taught how to use them. First shots were heard about 1 a.m. We rushed to the window opening onto the squre.

"Don't stick your neck out, there're snipers atop the COMECON building," someone shouted.

Someone said two people had been killed near the US embassy. One more volley of gunfire was heard, and a blue flash lit the sky. Shouts and roars were heard from the square.

An hour later the tension diminished. Another rumour (for some reason I believe rumours more than anything) said that H Hour has been postponed until 4 a.m.

"They haven't got the guts... they're rats..." "The most dangerous time is between 4 and 5. Psychologists say so. People tend to be less

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despite the boos of all who spiritually motivated the putsch, President Gorbachev would still be at his Foros dacha, waiting for what might happen, whether he might be poisoned or whether something else might be done to him.

* * *

We have changed, to be frank, to some degree thanks to Gorbachev, which I finally realized upon spotting the pages of the underground issue of *New Times* that had been pasted up at Metro stations on the morning of August 21. That morning I was heading for the Russian Federation Ministry of Education, and when I saw the crowds perusing these sheets on the marble walls of the Metro, I felt proud and happy.

Actually I was going to the Ministry for a rather unhappy purpose. Russian Education Minister Eduard Dneprov had set up overnight on his own hook an underground printing press to churn out leaflets reporting President Yeltsin's decrees. I had been asked to help draw up an appeal to schoolteachers and kindergarten tutors. I felt terrible! The time was about one o'clock in the afternoon, and nobody knew then how long the dictatorship would exist: for a day, a month, or, God forbid, some ten years longer.

It transpired that the dictatorship existed just for another couple of hours. Which was not fair, so next time, putschists, tell us at once how long you expect to hang on, for otherwise you will leave your supporters in the lurch. Indeed, had they known you were practical jokers, would they have ever made such imprudent statements blotting their records?

I have imagined a special execution for the putschists. What should be done would be to place them in the middle of a circle of those people who, because of their trust in them, had lost their jobs. A policeman would lead them in and after saying, "Steady, ready, go," nothing would be left of them, even of their bones, as they would be devoured alive at once.

* * *

Evidently by the Yeltsin choice the Lord above has at last turned His face to Russia. The catharsis the nation has suddenly undergone! Indeed, it seems as if the celestial psychologist had devised an extraordinary examination, with the result that in but 72 hours all executives in the public eye at once unerringly divided into the two categories of the honest and the dishonest. Moreover, without any rigmarole. Nearly all our ambassadors abroad took down Gorbachev's pictures, thinking there was no reason to have them up on the wall if he was in bed with sciatica. Only Boris Pankin in Czecho-Slovakia publicly repudiated the new authority at once. This sort of thing happened in every office, in every branch, everywhere. In some places some folk rushed to draw up lists of active anti-communists, I personally know one such design office. Just a little more, and denunciations would have poured in. After all, the accumulated experience is there.

Oh, had only the Lord's bidding been done at once!

* * *

There are two men about whom we are particularly curious. First is Lukyanov. Only recently he was called a son of a bitch in the press. I think, he will forever bear that stigma, and won't be called anything else. After all, the package of eclipse edicts was triggered off by Lukyanov's letter, one that seemed could not be faulted, as if everything was as plain as a pikestaff. It implied that Gorbachev had erred on the Union Treaty and that hence the junta was right. I think that regardless of his own wish, this evasiveness boomeranged, as after his shilly-shallying, when he nevertheless admitted that Yanayev had acted unlawfully, Yeltsin and his team immediately presented ultimatums. Lukyanov betrayed first his student chum, and then the conspirators. Fright consummated the whole thing. Isn't it awkward for a gang of eight to engineer a putsch, as who is to share the blame for the blood spilled?

Mention must also necessarily be made of one more character, who is certainly a "great guy." Having ideologically inspired the putsch, and impelling his fellow thinkers into the abyss of crime, he, though having obtained a Moscow flat, at once vamoosed. As a result, nobody even remembers him, although but a month ago he, Party boss Polozkov, was well-nigh the chief actor. Halloo, where are you?

* * *

We all stood in need not of a putsch or of putschists, but of a catharsis, a turnover in our own minds. It has taken place. Though nothing has changed, and life will be as hard, yet...

They stood

Our correspondent **Dmitry Zgersky** spent the night of August 20th in the chain of defenders of the Russian White House

For about half an hour I, along with colleagues from the Information Agency Novosti, dragged pipes and erected barricades alongside the tall buildings on Vosstaniya Square. Later, I did night watch along the stretch of Kalinin Prospekt between the Sadovoye Koltso and the headquarters for the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. There were not many people, perhaps only 300 if you don't count the onlookers gathered on the wide veranda of the COMECON building.

We divided into three ranks, each one 50 metres from the other, and partitioned the street with them between two barricades. They said that our area was the worst, as the first attack would probably have been there. At three in the morning we waited for the storming of the White House.

After an hour the shooting began. Tracer-bullets split the sky with a crackle, the distant drone of the advancing armoured personnel carriers was audible. The leader of the Social-Democratic Party, Deputy Oleg Rumyantsev, appeared. He looked like the typical intellectual – thin and not very tall, with glasses and a beard.

"Columns of armoured personnel carriers are approaching, and behind them are Spetsnaz troops. This information has not been confirmed, but prepare yourselves in any event. Link. You are our psychological attack on armed force. Try to talk to the soldiers. Remember: small, non-threatening gestures. Attempts to start a fight will quickly escalate into bloodshed. Drive away drunks, people with sticks, rocks or bottles. It is possible that these people could be provocateurs. Good-bye friends. I am going to try to stop them."

And he together with the deputy-priest went out to meet the increasing din.

A militia officer began to give us instructions: "Make way for the tanks, but close ranks before the soldiers. If they use *Cheryomukha* gas, cover your nose and mouth with a wet handkerchief." As only a few people had handkerchiefs, we decided to breathe through coat lapels dampened by the rain.

Before us, behind the walls of the barricade, roared the armoured personnel carriers and gunfire popped. An agitated man with a video camera came running up from the Sadovoye Koltso and yelled to us: "Who has a car? I filmed the first killing, and I have to send the film!"

Several young men wielded sticks. When I asked them to throw away their sticks, one of them brought his face very close to mine and said with hatred: "When you see the faces of the bandits, you'll wish you had a rifle in your hands."

A policeman took the sticks away from them and threw them onto one of the fires blazing under the trees on the grass.

The frail intellectual Oleg Rumyantsev managed to stop the armoured personnel carriers, but he suffered for it: they knocked out his teeth.

...We approached the underpass in Kalininsky Prospekt, and there, on the asphalt among the halted armoured carriers saw the telltale signs of a terrible fight. It was on this very spot that those three were killed, those whom we accompanied on their last journey on August 24.

It was reported that the storm was delayed for 4 hours. The electricity was cut off on the avenue. Everyone recalled the words of Landsbergis: "The darkest night comes just before sunrise." On the grass under the rain, the rock-group Brigade C was singing its songs. Women brought hot tea in thermoses and said gentle, comforting words to us.

Several times during the night our commanders came running out from the parliament building and told us to prepare for an attack. Then they would cancel their orders. We thought if only sunrise were sooner. That way, while they were dismantling our barricades and penetrating our weak defence (the radio reported that there were in all only some 30,000 people around the White House), the day would begin and the storm would fail.

Armoured personnel carriers suddenly appeared through the blanket of rain, when day was finally beginning to dawn. We firmly linked arms and softly began to sing that song by Okudzhava: "We'll join hands, friends, so as not to fall alone..." Somehow they got around the barricades to the right of us. When they were already very close, from the first vehicle came a shout through a megaphone:

"Move aside, friends! These people have come over to our side! Ten vehicles! A People's Deputy of Russia is speaking..."

We didn't hear his name through the joyful cries of "Hurrah!" Laughing soldiers waved to us.

"Long live Russia!" "Long live Yeltsin!" "Down with the Communists!"

Six other military vehicles joined us soon. It was already light, and my soul was happy.

Somewhere on Mozhaisk Shosse, the Vitebsk division of the "black berets" stood motionless. Somewhere were 34 tanks from Nizhny Novgorod... It would be good if it didn't rain the following night. We dispersed and headed home.

As I walked home along the Sadovoye Koltso under a steady rain, I thought that the most poignant impression of that night was made by the people's deputies. They are frail intellectuals, but it was mainly they who saved all of us there on Kalininsky Prospekt as the sky was weeping for those three, who were killed – the last victims of "the Great October Socialist Revolution."



Drawings made on the spot by Gennady Dobrov

Third Day

In the morning of August 21, it became evident that we had won. The feeling of victory gew in me as I climbed the barricades and saw girls feeding weary men, boys sleeping on the paving stones, and babushkas with thermoses full of hot tea. I felt like crying – these were tears of happiness. Everybody was so good, so nice, so strong, so kind. It had been a long time since I had seen so much concern and compassion in Muscovites' eyes. Suddenly I understood how much we all had changed.

Our conscience is clear, because we warned each of the future putschists

Had they followed the good advice of *New Times*, a putsch would not have been staged

Alexander Pumpyansky

Let me first of all apologize to our readers. I shall make several references to articles published previously in our magazine. I hope our readers will understand: it is not a matter of lack of modesty or the author's desire to quote himself.

Two months ago our magazine wrote (in its issue No. 26): "EITHER VLADIMIR KRYUCHKOV SHOULD RESIGN HIMSELF, OR THE PRESIDENT SHOULD GIVE HIM THE SACK." This happened after the monstrously stupid and cynical speech given by the KGB chairman (together with the speeches of the ministers of defence and the interior and the premier) at a session of the Soviet parliament. Kryuchkov explicitly threatened with a possible coup.

It's a pity that the KGB chief did not take our advice. He would have now been a pensioner quietly living at his country house. Instead, he is in prison, awaiting trial on charges of high treason and conspiracy.

It's also a pity that President Gorbachev did not heed our advice. He would have spared himself and his family the shock of being interned in the Crimea and spending three days as hostages of his former aides who had formed a military junta. He would have saved the country from a terrible ordeal, because the junta, holding the people at gunpoint, though with trembling hands, told them: "Don't resist, we shall rescue you."

After the article was published, we expected comments on it. But it was too much to expect a coup. We were well aware of the real worth of the future putschists. We knew that they were incompetent, but could go to any lengths. We are so spoiled by democracy, however, that we hoped to receive some written or printed reply. A reply did come, though to the newspaper *Pravda,* not to our magazine, and not from the KGB chairman, but from Oleg Shenin, a new "strong man" in the party, a secretary and Politburo member of the party's central committee. Shenin accused us of being presumptuous, of hurting the President's feelings by our advice and, rather unexpectedly, of violating journalistic ethics.

What does Shenin, a former party official, know about journalistic ethics? Our full-time party officials have an amazing habit. With little knowledge and bearing no responsibility, they have taught peasants how to sow and plough, miners how to work, and journalists how to observe ethics.

We did not agree with Shenin's comments in *Pravda* and sent our response to that newspaper. In view of the intellectual level of our high opponents and *Pravda* readers, we spelled out our conclusions. The KGB is a specific organization with clearly defined functions. It has no right to interfere in politics. The use of the secret services' methods and force in politics is mortally dangerous for democracy and a civilized society. For two weeks *Pravda* editors hesitated, vaguely promising to publish our letter on the discussion page, naturally with a sharp rebuke. But, they claimed, first they had to show the letter to Shenin. As a result, we had to publish our letter in our own magazine, repeating our warning (No. 30).

Our dear colleagues at *Pravda,* your affection for party secretaries and Politburo members is quite understandable. But if you sincerely loved and valued Oleg Shenin, you should have published our letter and recommended that he reconsider his stand, that the party should defend society from the KGB, rather than the KGB from journalists. If Shenin had done this at the time, he could have continued work as before, peacefully engaging in affairs useless to society, but not dangerous for his own life.

Incidentally, the party would also do well if its leaders did not hasten to demonstrate by their actions that it was an anti-popular conspiratorial organization.

Oleg Baklanov, another secretary of the party's central committee, had even more time for meditation. We warned him twice and well in advance. Since he was a party secretary in charge of defence affairs, we advised him to stop sowing panic that the Soviet Union was about to be attacked by the imperialists. No one is going to attack our country. Baklanov should have concentrated on working out the strategy and tactics of conversion.

We drew the people's attention to Baklanov as a living embodiment of the party-military-industrial complex. He was a dangerous figure, and not even by virtue of his character. Because of his position Baklanov saw the tragedy not in the fact that the people had been impoverished by the senseless arms race but rather in perestroika having rid us of the "enemies" and the military-industrial complex of its raison d'être. The point is that the end of the cold war with the West inevitably leads to the demilitarization of our society.

On the second day of the putsch, Col. Gen. Kalinin, commander of the Moscow military district, appeared on TV. The general, who was appointed commandant of Moscow during the emergency situation, read out a statement written for him by an unknown author. It contained monstrous, overtly false words about some obscure provocateurs, raging mobs and drunken youths who allegedly attacked tanks. We heard again the familiar clichés with which our prosecutors, military and civilian, explained what had taken place in Tbilisi, Vilnius, Riga and even in Novocherkassk 20 years ago.

We have repeatedly exposed this lie. The public appearance of military commanders like Rodionov and Makashov was described by us as "a riot of colonel generals." If only Col. Gen. Rodionov had been demoted at least by one rank after the Tbilisi events, instead of being appointed head of the General Staff Academy... If only

Makashov had been forced, as we advised, to choose just one occupation: either to concentrate on the affairs of the military district under his command or to engage in politics, but only upon retiring. In short, had the "riot of colonel generals" been quelled, the putsch would not have been staged.

One Saturday morning, when many people go fishing or to the forest, we met with Marshal Akhromeyev in our editorial office and talked with him for five hours (Nos 14 and 15). We asked one question after another, trying to give him a chance to reveal at least some convincing points in his position, but we could not find them. The marshal said that the army was slandered. The worst slander of all was the talk about a conspiracy or a military coup allegedly hatched in the army. The very thought of a coup was offensive. Indeed, the army was loyal to the party at the time the party's leading role was mentioned in the Constitution, but now it is loyal only to the President.

In the past few days I wanted to phone Marshal Akhromeyev, but something stopped me from doing that. I thought it would not be proper to phone him at such a time. What could I ask him when everything was clear? I was not in a hurry to phone the marshal, instinctively giving him an opportunity to make his move. And he has done it. Marshal Akhromeyev has committed suicide.

Well, he acted courageously, though the latest events showed how many generals we have and how few genuine officers there are among them. I think the future military reform should balance this equation.

We advocate a tactful attitude towards people. As regards Premier Pavlov, our magazine has always written about him with disgust as "a man who evokes a dreadful suspicion that life may not return to normal, but you will certainly be fleeced." There was almost no argument between us and Starodubtsev, chairman of the Peasants' Union of the USSR, who also joined the putschists. It turned out that this fervent champion of the fettering collective-farm system could be brought to his senses only by one means – taking him into custody. The well-known publicist Yuri Chernichenko criticized Starodubtsev many times, in our magazine, too, but this did not have any effect on him. When arrested, he was enlightened and immediately repented what he had done.

As regards Tizyakov, another member of the State Committee for the State of Emergency and president of the Association of State Enterprises in Industry, Construction, Transport and Communications, our publicist Tatiana Ivanova devoted an article to him on the Female Logic page. He is indeed a phenomenon of our turbulent days. Tizyakov proudly addressed his warning and appeal to the people and himself responded to this appeal by joining the junta of putschists. No one knows what kind of man he is. He is like the yeti, who has left tracks, but no one knows whether he exists in reality. True, this "snowman" was caught, and the investigation will establish whether he is a phantom or not.

During his visit to Moscow, President Bush gave a dinner for President Gorbachev in the residence of the US ambassador. He sat at one table with Gorbachev's wife, and Gorbachev sat with the wife of the US President. Boris Yeltsin sat at one table with Secretary of State Baker. I do not remember now who was beside Vice-President Yanayev. He sat modestly and bucked up only when he noticed his acquaintances. On seeing me he smiled and made a dialling sign near his ear, thus asking me why I did not phone him and suggesting that I ring him up some time.

I came to know Yanayev some 25 years ago, when I worked in the newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* and he was chairman of the Committee of Youth Organizations of the USSR. Everyone knew his dream. Yanayev wanted to become first secretary of the Young Communist League. But his dream was not realized. For many years he worked in the Union of Friendship Societies until he got onto the career escalator, which carried him up. Yanayev was elected secretary of the All-Union Council of Trade Unions, then its deputy chairman and chairman, a member of parliament from the trade unions, later a secretary, and then a Politburo member of the party's central committee. He vowed that all his life he had dreamt of serving the workers, the voters, the Communist Party. Finally, he was elected vice-president of the USSR, the post he could never aspire to occupy. He became a truly powerful statesman whose potency could be confirmed only by his wife, if one is to believe what he said. And how could we doubt this if he declared it publicly at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR?!

Boris Pugo, as far as I remember, was a soft-hearted, educated and cultured man. He had pleasant manners, could listen to others and did not pose as a VIP, though he had good reason to. Pugo used to be the leader of Latvia's Young Communist League, secretary of the All-Union Young Communist League in charge of ties with socialist countries, first secretary of the Riga city party committee, chairman of the Latvian KGB, first secretary of the Latvian Communist Party (he delivered one of the most liberal speeches at the latest Congress of the Soviet Communist Party), head of the party's Central Control Commission in Moscow, and interior minister of the USSR..



This drawing by *NT* designer Igor Shein was published in one of the NT June issues

The end chosen by Pugo (he shot himself) also shows in a way that he was not among the worst people. He was evidently corrupted by the insatiable desire inherent in the upper crust – the desire to lead something, no matter what the Com-

munist Party or the KGB, in a republic or in Moscow, with the sole purpose of remaining at the top. The gang of eight villains consisted of adventurers and timid people, those who had long wanted to strangle democracy and strike out at its flabby leader and those who joined the putschists with a sigh of regret and a feeling of some inevitability, deciding that there was no other option.

Gorbachev handpicked all his aides himself, either skilfully persuading the parliament to approve his nominees, or trying to bypass it. He was guided by the principle of convenience, as in choosing slippers. As a result, there appeared such figures as Lukyanov, Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, who began to fear the imminent signing of the Union Treaty, Kryuchkov, a little Napoleon in the post of KGB chairman, and Yanayev, a good fellow from the Young Communist League, as vice-president and the chief servant who decided that he could run affairs better than his master. No wonder they finally proved to be werewolves and again, it is not a matter of individual traits of character, but of the type of man.

By August 19, 1991, almost the entire bureaucratic class, the entire party-economic-military establishment opposed Gorbachev. They spoke about their opposition openly, and this made the conspirators more confident. As for the people, they did not know it.

The perestroika initiated by Gorbachev was a revolution from above, a bureaucratic revolution, though of a special kind. It has awakened and emancipated the people, and this is its main achievement. Then followed a democratic revolution, the revolution of Sakharov in its highest expression, the revolution of the free press, emerging movements and multi-party system, the revolution of Sobchak, Popov, Yeltsin and others.

The bureaucratic revolution was at odds with the democratic one and fought against it. There was also discord within the bureaucratic revolution. Thanks to his art of manoeuvring and compromise, Gorbachev won each conflict, but every time he was also defeated, because he was losing his colleagues, increasingly becoming a hostage to those whom he so skilfully routed. In the end, he made great strides on the question of signing the Union treaty and in foreign policy, stopped hesitating in carrying out reforms. But by then he had lost almost all his colleagues, creative personalities, such as Shevardnadze, Shatalin, Petrakov, Yavlinsky, and Yakovlev... The President remained alone. And then the bureaucracy decided to strangle the revolution.

Luckily, they did not expect the democratic revolution to rise to the defence of perestroika, its achievements, and Gorbachev personally.

Were it not for the victims of the putsch, I would publicly express gratitude to the junta on behalf of the people. The social revolution has thrown off all bureaucratic fetters, put an end to communism and the empire, and the old bureaucratic power. The putschists indeed deserve gratitude for this, along with a court sentence, of course.

How we published *NT* No. 34

Our subscribers received the previous issue of *New Times* a bit late. We want to explain the reason and apologize. The delay was caused by the actions of the military junta.

At a brief meeting on the morning of August 19, the editors decided that we would work as usual. Staff writers were preparing articles on the military putsch under the general heading, "They have staged a coup, but their hands are trembling." Professional duty merged with the civilian one. We had to bring all available information to the readers in order to help them understand what was taking place. All this had to be done in one day.

TV announcers read out the list of periodicals allowed for further publication. There was no *New Times* among them. It was announced that a special body attached to the State Committee for the State of Emergency would deal with the mass media. Our colleagues expressed the opinion that censors, appointed by the State Committee, were about to appear in newspaper and magazine offices any moment. We called *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, a daily newspaper which was to be printed at night. Censors had not come to its office. We were unable to find traces of the mysterious body for the affairs of the press. An attempt was made to block the publication of our magazine in the printing house, though the Moskovskaya Pravda Press continued to work.

On August 20, the issue was sent to the printers stricktly according to schedule. Svetlana Orekhova, who is in charge of publishing the magazine, reported from the Moskovskaya Pravda Press that the computer composing shop was working on the issue of *New Times* and that the first printing plates had been made. A curfew was imposed the night of August 20, and so all staff members went home. However, some of them went to the barricades and were able to get into the Russian White House.

The next morning it turned out that Moskovskaya Pravda was not publishing our magazine. We heard the most absurd explanations: machines had broken in the offset shop, all of a sudden the publishing house had run out of paper, it was necessary to wait for censors.

At noon, the editors received a telephone message from the director of the Moskovskaya Pravda Publishing House. "In connection with the emergency situation that arose in the area where the publishing house is situated and the introduction of a curfew in Moscow, and in agreement with superior bodies, the work of the printing house has been temporarily suspended," the message said. We are very vulnerable. The editors took the discs and films away from Moskovskaya Pravda Publishing House so that they would not be destroyed there. But we depend on Moskovskaya Pravda Publishing House, and there is no other printing house to which we could send the discs and films. There are no independent printing houses.

We decided not to wait, and began to make xerox copies of the articles. Our staff members pasted xerox copies in the subway stations and brought them to the Moscow Soviet and the Russian White House. We had telephone calls and requests from people: "Give us the issue. We have high-speed xeroxes. We shall print a thousand copies." Crowds of people gathered to read *New Times* articles pasted on the walls.

On August 21, at three o'clock in the afternoon, it became clear that the coup did not succeed. Perhaps now Moskovskaya Pravda Publishing House would make up for lost time. But the printing house was locked. The publishing house director explained that the press had been closed because they were afraid of the indignant readers of the banned newspaper *Moskovsky Komsomolets*.

On the morning of August 22, the guard at the entrance gate of the Moskovskaya Pravda Press took the pass away from Svetlana Orekhova. The putsch had failed, but Moskovskaya Pravda Press did not resume work on our magazine. The polite editors of *New Times* had a tough talk with the publishing house administration. A sudden change took place in its behaviour. Within 40 minutes Moskovskaya Pravda Press completed the work it would not do during the past day and a half. Last December, our magazine became an independent periodical. In August, we saw how right we were in doing so. *New Times* does not depend on anyone. It depends only on its readers.

Our magazine can be closed, but no one can compel us to tell a lie. It's a pity, dear readers, that you received the previous issue with delay. True, not all of you. The defenders of the Russian White House received *New Times* even earlier than it could be delivered by the quickest postman. They received it not Friday, but Wednesday, the morning after an atempt was made to storm the parliament building.

The editors of *New Times*

NATION

WHAT IS GOING ON

They've staged a putsch, but their hands are trembling

Photos by Valery Mikhailov, Vladimir Vyatkin, Dmitry Khegai, Dmitry Donskoy

The citadel of Russian freedom

The hopes of all those to whom freedom is dear are connected with the Russian White House (the seat of the president and the parliament of Russia), with the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Republic, with Boris Yeltsin. The Russian White House has become a symbol of resistance to the putschists. The idea of the White House belongs, which has been developed by Yevgeni Vasiliev, a Moscow architect. Recently, as a nation-transforming nobleness, exultation, courage, the determination to assume full responsibility, and restraint.

Many Yeltsin foes will once called Yeltsin. In the early hours after the putsch he declared he

The KGB knew everything, and acted accordingly

A KGB Lieutenant Colonel says the KGB was one of the organizers of the August putsch and had prepared public opinion in advance for the rolling back of democratic freedoms

Alexander Kichikhin

In the past year, the prevailing sentiment among the KGB central staff has visibly shifted to the right. The senior staff were actively indoctrinating the field officers of the KGB. There are many examples of this. One example is the meeting of the KGB's political officers with the editors of the conservative daily *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* held at the Dzerzhinsky Culture Club at the end of last year. No concert, no interesting cultural event in the KGB club has ever been attended by so many people. When *Sovetskaya Rossiya's* Editor-in-Chief, Valentin Chikin, appeared on the stage, the audience rose to greet him.

Chikin focused on the propaganda of the socialist choice, loyalty to the CPSU, the rejection of the "alternative" forms of ownership and the necessity to reorganize the national economy. The editor elaborated on the "Filshin case" and allowed himself to make some derogatory remarks about the parliament of the Russian republic.

A similar example of purposeful indoctrination of the KGB personnel was Vladimir Kryuchkov's speech at the in camera sitting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. After he gave his speech in parliament, its text was circulated in KGB departments "upon numerous requests of the personnel."

The conservative slant in the KGB grew as younger officers, who joined the KGB in the past five to seven years and were reluctant to serve on the criteria of the 1930s and 1940s, quit their jobs in the KGB. Starting in October 1990, up to 600 officers left the KGB every month. One officer accompanied his appeal for retirement with a letter addressed to Vladimir Kryuchkov, in which he explained his decision by the impression that the KGB "was in an intellectual grave."

The statement by the Board of the KGB to the effect that some of the KGB bodies were discredited by the KGB chief's involvement in the coup d'état, in my opinion, had a very definite aim: to help other ideologues and participants in the coup avoid responsibility. Who are they?

... Almost a year has passed since the Department for Information and Analysis (IAU) was set up in the KGB. Valery Lebedev was appointed head of the new department.

Valery Lebedev is known among his colleagues as the evil demon of the KGB. He joined the KGB in the early 1970s and started working for the anti-Zionism section of the former 5th Chief Directorate. The section in which Lebedev worked also dealt with the cases of dissidents. Lebedev was the first of the KGB senior staff to be sent for training to the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU's Central Committee. He graduated from the Academy in 1982 and was appointed deputy head of the interethnic relations section. Later, he was promoted to section head. After that he became deputy head of Directorate Five. In 1987, he became Kryuchkov's advisor for domestic affairs and then first deputy chairman of the KGB. Lebedev's patron was the former first deputy chairman of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov, the long-time head of Directorate Five.

The Department for Information and Analysis, which was set up on Lebedev's initiative, processes all documents that get to the KGB central apparat from its local branches as well as all documents the KGB sends to the CPSU and state bodies. The IAU knows everything that goes on in the KGB. This department was shaping the opinion of the Soviet leadership and the central apparat of the CPSU on concrete issues by sending them information and recommendations and in return it was receiving the state and party leadership's directives. These directives were based on the information supplied by the IAU. This completed the cycle.

The responsibilities of the IAU included the processing of information about domestic political processes. The processed information was later sent to the office of the President of the USSR, to Lebedev's successor, Yury Kobyakov.

Yury Kobyakov has worked for the KGB since the mid-1970s. Until the mid-1980s he was responsible for the problem of the Crimean Tatars in former Directorate Five. He was the author of the programme Mubarek Zone, which provided for the continued settlement of the Crimean Tatars in Uzbekistan. After Lebedev had been appointed deputy head of Directorate Five,



Alexander KICHIKHIN, Lieutenant Colonel of the KGB, officer of the KGB Department for the Defence of the Constitution. Last October he appeared carrying a placard outside the Rossiya Hotel near the Kremlin, informing the public that Soviet Germans living in the Volga Region were victimized by the Mafia and the Communist Party apparat. He sent an open letter to Mikhail Gorbachev, but never got a reply. He gave an interview to *NT*, describing what he knew about the Soviet Germans' plight. He was one of the signatories of a collective letter of KGB officers demanding the departification of the security service. He was removed from active service in August last year. On August 19, 1991, he applied for retirement, and called on the servicemen and officers of the KGB and the Interior Ministry not to use arms and to serve the motherland and the people

Kobyakov became head of the interethnic relations section. He graduated from the High Party School under the CPSU's Moscow City Committee. In 1988, he replaced Alexander Karabainov in the administrative organs department of the CPSU's Central Committee. After presidency was introduced in the USSR, Kobyakov started working in the apparat of the President of the USSR.

It can be said that the President was getting all the analytical information about domestic processes from the KGB, because there is no other institution in this country processing such vast amounts of information concerning political processes and public sentiments. The KGB was feeding information to the President every day. I do not think it is necessary to elaborate on the kind of assessments that were provided to the President by people who had built their careers upon suppressing dissidents. It is not a coincidence that in many of his speeches Gorbachev used the terms widely used by the KGB, such as "extremists," "anti-social groups," "nationalists."

On the morning of August 19, the IAU leadership called the junior staff and solemnly announced that their long-standing dream had come true and the socialist principles had triumphed. This announcement met with a luke-warm reception. On the other hand, it is not a KGB custom to be overtly emotional about events.

An important role in preparing the coup was played by the Department for the Defence of the Constitution, better known as Department Z. This department was set up two years ago, following the reorganization of Directorate Five. The reorganization only slightly altered its structure, and the main result of it was the change of name. The general lines of the department's work remained the same. Department Z controls almost all aspects of political life in the country – joint ventures (except those set up by the CPSU Central Committee), all sorts of cultural and charity foundations (except those set up by the Communist Party apparat), organized crime, public unrest and, naturally, interethnic conflicts. Department Z operates an extensive network of agents and informers in the media, including TV and radio across the country. Using its people planted in the mass media and public organizations, Department Z could not only study, but also influence the political processes in the country.



One example. On July 3, 1990, the former head of Department Z, Yevgeny Ivanov, and the head of Department 6, General Savenkov, nominated some officers of their departments for awards and bonuses for their activities in Novokuznetsk, then the venue of the first congress of representatives of workers' movements, attended by representatives of strike committees from Vorkuta, Kuzbas and Donbas... Here is an extract from the order for the presentation of awards:

"The said congress attracted the interest and attention of some officials of the British Embassy, who have been known to be associated with secret services, foreign correspondents accredited in the Soviet Union, representatives of Solidarnosc, members of the Popular Labour Alliance, as well as representatives of informal unconstitutional organizations, such as Sajudis, Rukh, etc... As a result of the measures taken in this respect, it became possible to localize the subversive intentions of hostile special services aimed at gathering negative information about the situation in the workers' movement. Joint efforts for coordination of sources who arrived at the congress as delegates, consultants and guests made it possible to prevent the adoption of extremist decisions and actions on the part of some workers' delegations and their leaders, to disrupt the formation of a centralized leadership of the strike movement in this country, and to prevent such a leadership from falling under the control of radically-minded political adventurists and unconstitutional organizations."



Shortly before the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia last March, Alexander Redkin, now head of the interethnic relations section, suggested to the KGB leadership that a letter of protest be fabricated, allegedly sent by the Russian-speaking minorities of the Baltics to the Russian Parliament. The aim was to discredit the Russian Parliament, making it look as if the Russians were oppressed in the Baltics, while the Yeltsin leadership in Moscow wouldn't lift a finger to help them. It appears that the KGB leadership endorsed this suggestion.

During the March Congress of People's Deputies of Russia, Department Z organized special groups. Actually, everything that went on in Moscow during those days was very similar to a coup situation. I think that was the second signal that a putsch was coming. At that time the KGB displayed a cool reaction to the appearance of troops in the city, and three months before the KGB had been very calm about Eduard Shevardnadze's warning about impending dictatorship. What was discussed was the fact of Shevardnadze's resignation rather than the content of his speech. Moreover, the discussion never went on without a grim. It was at that time that rumours started circulating in the KGB that Alexander Yakovlev and Eduard Shevardnadze cooperated with the CIA. It must be noted for the sake of objectivity that the first warning about the dictatorship and the KGB's role in it came from a group of KGB officers who addressed the USSR Supreme Soviet last October. The address said that the KGB remained a formidable weapon of the CPSU, that it was too conservative and heavily politicized. We urged the USSR Supreme Soviet to prevent the partocrats, disguised in the mantle of democracy, from provoking a conflict between the KGB and the nation. Even then we believed that KGB institutions and troops could be used in a military coup.

Last March, Department Z set up special groups from amog the departmental personnel. Not all officers had the privilege of joining them. Most members of those groups were young officers who had served no more than a year, and the most loyal and tested officers.

One such group, for instance, included one Sapunov, an officer from Department Z. In the days when Latvia was rocked by a series of explosions, Sapunov was in Riga, the Latvian capital, together with the deputy head of Department Z. He returned to Moscow with a concussion. The explanation was that while in Riga, he went dancing and wass hit on the head during a fight there. It is difficult for me to picture a KGB officer on an assignment going dancing and joining a fight there.

Vladimir Lutsenko, who was in Riga together with Sapunov, is in charge of the organized crime section. Shortly before the trip to Latvia, he spoke at a KGB training class, showing a video about his team arresting a group of arms dealers in the town of Kovrov. The story was that arms were being taken out of an arms factory in Kovrov and then sold to Armenian militants. After having watched the video, one officer rose and said the whole thing looked like a one-hundred-percent setup to him: the KGB team first found the buyers and then arrested them.

Department Z set up three such groups, headed by the first deputy head of Department Z Dobrovolsky, Moroz and people's deputy of the Russian Federation Fedoseyev.

At 4 a.m. on August 19, the officer on duty at Department Z got a call from deputy Chairman of the KGB, Valery Lebedev. The order from Lebedev was to summon Department Head Valery Vorotnikov, Deputy Department Head and people's deputy of the Russian Federation Ivan Fedoseyev, and Deputy Department Head Igor Perfilyev by 6 a.m. The rest of the senior staff were to report to work at 7 a.m.

The **day before** these events, there was an order to make up lists of groups which were to be used in an emergency. Initially, 60 people from the department personnel were chosen for such groups. Of that number, only 30 were selected. On Sunday, it was only possible to contact 25. They were to report to work at 5 p.m. Sunday. The head of the group was Alexander Moroz.

A simimlar group was set up under the Third Chief Directorate of the KGB (military counterintelligence and police control). These groups were armed, and its members were issued travelling IDs with no specified destination. In the evening, they were put on buses and taken to an unknown destination. Some of them later turned up in Riga and Vilnius. They were not employed there, but they could not return directly to Moscow either. They came back via Vitebsk on Thursday.

On August 19, the department received an instruction from Vladimir Kryuchkov: approve the actions of the State Committee for the State of Emergency. The prevailing mood in the department was gloomy. Rank-and-file officers said bluntly that the takeover was a swinish thing. By August 21 and 22, the mood had changed: officers were afraid that crowds might ransack the premises and kill communists and KGB people. On August 19 and 20, department head Valery Vorotnikov and his deputies Yury Denisov and Igor Perfilyev met with the staff, urging them to carry out Vladimir Kryuchkov's instructions. The operations group of the department spent the morning of August 19 fully armed and waiting. At the same time, the section headed by Alexander Redkin declared it would not obey the putschists' orders. Redkin was the only one who did not do that.

One more group, whose task was to round up all the undesirable persons, was headed by Dobrovolsky, was busy closing down printshops and radio stations. These operations were also carried out by the Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence).

Gennady Dobrovolsky is Deputy Head of Department Z. He worked as Chebrikov's assistant. When Chebrikov was transferred to the Central Committee. Dobrovolsky went with him. After Chebrikov's resignation, Dobrovolsky returned to the KGB as Deputy Chairman and has been working there ever since. The internment group under Dobrovolsky's command arrested investigator Gdlyan. Other

names on the list of those arrested included Father Yakunin, Galina Starovoitova and many other pro-democracy figures.

I am under the impression that the KGB generals were guided by personal, as much as political reasons when planning the coup and an attack on the 'white house'. Most officers currently working for the KGB started their careers in Directorate Five, suppressing dissent. That same Valery Lebedev started his career in the section which was dealing with the case of Sergei Kovalyov, a well-known dissident and now the Chairman of the Human Rights Committee of the Supreme Soviet of Russia. Deputy heads of Department Z Igor Perfilyev and Alexander Moroz also started work at Department 5. What feelings can they have about Yeltsin's entourage?

The Third Chief Directorate controls the sentiments in the army and monitors everything that happens in the armed forces, including troops movements. Officers of the Special Sections in the army units must report all information about troops movements to the Third Directorate, they can also influence troop movements and issue orders for the deployment of troops. I have already said in a *New Times* interview that Defence Minister Yazov ordered troops to demolish Crimean Tatars' tent camps in the Crimea. At that time the operation was frustrated, because officers of the Special Sections did not receive a confirmation order from the KGB and stopped the deployment of troops. On August 19-21, the troops were deployed in Moscow and other cities on the knowledge of the Third Chief Directorate – it could not have happened otherwise.

In addition to these officers who exercise control in units, the KGB has its own units. Before the adoption of the Law on the KGB these units included Spetsnaz (special mission groups), signal batallions, engineers and border guards. The Law on the KGB allows the KGB to have some other units as well. Besides, two Spetsnaz divisions were transferred to the KGB from the Defence Ministry last March. On August 19, the goal of this transfer became obvious. As a result of all the transfers, it is now impossible to determine how many troops are currently under KGB command. It is equally impossible to know where the Dzerzhinsky Division was located during the putsch and especially before an expected attack on the 'white house.' Perhaps the situation with the Dzerzhinsky Division was the same as that with Group A, which is often incorrectly referred to as Group Alpha. Group A includes a total of 150 men, but on August 21, only 30 Group A men were in Moscow. The rest were either on vacation or deployed in areas of interethnic conflicts: some of them were known to be in Nagorno-Karabakh, getting ready to free hostages. I spoke to one of the Group A men on August 21. He said the Group did not dare storm the 'white house': it was demoralized by the crowds of people. Moreover, the storming was technically unfeasible. The technology of storming is such that first troops storm a building and disperse the crowds around it and then Group A men infiltrate the premises. They rarely shoot, because they are trained in other effective methods of neutralizing people. Unlike during the storming of the Vilnius TV Centre, in Moscow there were no troops blazing the trail for Group A.

On the night of August 22, one more KGB unit was remembered – the KGB regiment stationed in Tyoply Stan. A group of people's deputies of Russia went there and saw that the regiment was on a standby alert, but had received no orders to move to the centre.

When Yeltsin issued the decree on the transfer of all military units under Russian control on August 21, officers of the Third Chief Directorate unanimously agreed to fight back if deputies came to seal the premises or confiscate the archives.

On August 21, three officers of Department Z declared their intention to withdraw from the CPSU. The answer from the Department senior staff was that they would be expelled form the party, rather than permitted to quit voluntarily.

One more page in the history of the KGB-organized putsch.

On August 21, as they looked out of the windows overlooking the inner yard of the KGB main building, officers could see Vladimir Kryuchkov get in his limousine intending to head for Vnukovo Airport. Kryuchkov's luggage included two briefcases and two large bags.

At 4 p.m. on August 22, the KGB staff received an order to collect all the materials in bags and prepare them for destruction. The order was difficult to carry out, because half the officers were not at work, but were walking around Moscow instead. At 5 p.m., another order came: the materials were to be returned to their places. In the evening of the same day almost all the senior staff of Department Z was busy destroying the documents on shreders. Lower-rank officers had no access to shreders.

In the afternoon of August 23 came the order to prepare all the IAU documents for destruction. The order was cancelled at 6 p.m. The IAU was not working very hard that week, producing a couple of information reviews, but the officers thought that their work was not needed any longer. The reviews contained brief information about the reaction in the West and the republics to the situation in the country. All major documents were destroyed at the IAU from 3 p.m. to 7 p.m. of August 21.

The role of the KGB Department for Moscow and the Moscow Region and the KGB of Russia deserves special mention.

At 10 a.m. on August 19, the heads of the district KGB sections of Moscow and the Moscow Region called for a conference attended by the Deputy KGB Chairman, Prilukov, who said that all officers of the KGB Department of Moscow and the Moscow Region who disagreed with the emergency committee's decisions would be repressed. Prilukov's telegram was addressed to heads of services, detached sections and city and district apparats (No. 14555) and ordered that the KGB Department of Moscow and the Moscow region set up an operations staff, including deputy department head Kucherov, deputy department head Korsak, third deputy Pashutin and 21 more senior officers.

In addition to the patrol service in Moscow, Prilukov's order instructed the Department of Moscow and the Moscow Region "to step up activities for countering the enemy's subversive and sabotage activities against industrial, transportation and communication facilities, facilities providing for normal functioning of the city communal service, to prevent emrgencies, sabotage, wrecking and anti-social manifestations." Non-staff operational groups, and the maximum alert Volna groups were put on the stand-by alert on August 19 until further orders form the centre.

This is very familiar terminology.

More evidence that the putsch had been prepared and planned in advance by the KGB senior staff is Vladimir Kryuchkov's Order No. 0036 of March 19, 1991 – issued several days before the convening of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia – withdrawing the KGB Department of Moscow and the Moscow Region from the control of the Moscow city authorities and placing it under the command of the KGB central apparat. This change in the KGB order of command was not widely known, unlike a similar change in the Moscow police.

The Russian KGB, which was set up six months ago, had not started functioning by the time the putsch occurred. The Chairman of the KGB of Russia, Vitaly Ivanenko, was unable to get Kryuchkov to specify the establishment of the Russian KGB. Vladimir Kryuchkov allotted only 20 vacancies to the Russian KGB, which were immediately filled by typists, secretaries and maintenance staff. All reports from KGB officers who refused to go on working under the KGB senior staff's pressure and wanted to be transferred to the KGB of Russia were ignored. Many good field officers of the KGB have retired, found civilian jobs and have no intention of returning to the KGB system. The KGB of Russia has been idle for six months. Perhaps this was another factor that made the coup possible.

It is imperative that there be an investigation independent even from the KGB's new leadership, and would reveal the participation of all KGB officials and officers in the preparations for and execution of the anti-constitutional actions of August 19-21, 1991. After all, the probability of another coup is still there.

Good-bye, CPSU

Lev Bezymensky

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, formely the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), formerly the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), formerly the Russian Social-Democratic Party (Bolsheviks), is dead

Photo by Dmitry Borko

It has been dead since the night of August 20, 1991. If the party leadership's involvement in the putsch is confirmed, the date of the party's death will be fixed as the night of August 18.

However, the party was alive until the evening of August 20. It had a unique chance to save its name and the honour of its members. It could have saved itself it it had called on itself and its organizations to rise up and defend law and democracy at the end of August 19; if it had used its sophisticated organization, its regional and district committees to become the nucleus of resistance to the junta; if it had not hesitated to free its General Secretary from his Crimean captivity; if it had mobilized the secretary of the Yalta regional committee or at least the secretary of the Alupka district committee to help Gorbachev; if it had led the defence of the Russian White House in the horrible hight of August 19; if its Central Committee had become the stronghold of freedom and defence of the Motherland; if...

... On August 20 I was in the CPSU Central Committee headquarters in Moscow's Staraya Ploshchad. The high-ceilinged corridors were calm, the rugs were soft and the light was wery gentle. The building was very quiet. Few people walked along the corridors. I asked one CC official what the Central Committee thought about the developments. The Secretariat convened yesterday, he said, and discussed the situation, but no document has been released. The initial intention was to convene a Central Committee plenum, but later it was rejected. Nothing more.

Why didn't the CPSU have an original position on the **main** problem of the nation? This fact alone was the death sentence of the organization claiming to be a political party. Even the Liberal Democratic party of Mr. Zhirinovsky had its own stand when it vocally supported the junta. And the CPSU kept silent. That's how it looked.

Unfortunately, we continue to live in a world with two realities. In one reality the Central Committee of the CPSU acted as a passive onlooker with no opinion before millions of party members. This is one reality. But it has turned out that there was another reality and another party image which will be fatal for the CPSU. According to none other than Nursultan Nazarbayev – former Politburo member, leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan, and President of Kazakhstan – on August 19 and 20, that is after the Secretariat sitting, he received from Moscow a secret directive to support the putschists. Another piece of evidence furnished by Mikhail Gorbachev himself is even more ruinous for the party: Politburo member and Secretary of the Central Committee Oleg Shenin was one of the junta's representatives who arrested the Soviet President at his Crimean dacha.

We are not carrying out an investigation, the CPSU involvement is now the concern

of the Procurator-General Office. We are reflecting on something which is evident without the Procurator. We are not even reflecting on the fact that some of the junta members were also members of the CPSU Central Committee of which Yanayev told journalists with an air of naive pride when he appeared at the August 19 news conference. What is more terrible is the spiritual kinship of the ideology and practice of the putsch with the tendency that has been prevailing in the activities of the CPSU leadership recently and has been increasingly reflected in the Communist Party press.

This tendency, or more explicitly, a comprehensive political strategy, had been started by Nina Andreyeva's notorious letter to *Sovetskaya Rossiya* and shortly before the coup was supported in the manifesto *A Word to the Nation,* similar to those of the Tsar and published in that same *Sovetskaya Rossiya.* The leadership was trying hard to put the whole party on the conservative track.

Did the CPSU exist at that time as a single whole? The CPSU split long ago, and not because factions appeared inside the party. By the way, the split of the party would not be a negative development – after all, it would at least be possible to start a discussion. But instead of discussing things, the party remained as if in a coma. The party disintegrated not into factions, but into loosly connected strata. There was the stratum of the party elite which was preoccupied with its own problems and had virtually lost touch even with the lower party structures, to say nothing of the people. Another rather heterogeneous stratum was that of the medium-level apparatchiks of regional and district party committees across the country. As the August events have demonstrated, most local party committes were still devoted to the old ways and traditions. Lower still, there is the stratum of rank-and-file CPSU members, those very rank-and-file members on whose behalf the party leadership acts without bothering to ask their opinion. I am sure that there were many communists among the defenders of the Russian non-partisan president. They assembled on the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment outside the White House in response to the call of their conscience, not the call of their party. Some of the rank-and-file, though, rushed to their party organizations to pay their party dues in order to get into the mainstream of party policies.

The fate of this multimillion stratum is the most tragic one. These people have been betrayed twice. As for the junta, its intentions are clear: it wanted to herd the CPSU members back to the old system. Just imagine the 29th Congress of the CPSU (I doubt that it will ever convene) under the conditions of the Lukyanov-Shenin regime! Another great betrayal was perpetrated by the Central Committees of republican Communist Parties, including the Communist Party of Russia, whose conduct in the days of the crisis discredited millions of rank-and-file party members. A third betrayal is in the offing now. "The rank-and-file party members are not to blame" is the new thesis. Ironically however, it is heard from the party generals who suddenly developed a profound concern for the rank-and-file. Too late! This argument smells of the desire to save the party bosses, not the rank-and-file. The real concern for the rank-and-file would be expressed in the opportunity given to the millions of former CSPU members to become active members of the new civil society, nand not to be deprived of civil rights in the manner of the 1920s. Former CPSU members must become active participants in the process of radical change.

It is with a feeling of concern that I reflect on all this. The public reaction to the CPSU's conduct is understandable, of course. It is easy to understand Boris Yeltsin's decrees on the suspension of the activities of the party's leading bodies and the sealing of the premises belonging to the CPSU. However, these decrees are only one and the easiest step. If no further measures are taken, these decrees may make life easier for the neo-Bolsheviks who would portray themselves as victims, soliciting sympathy at the grass roots level. No one can guarantee that the defeated and embittered partocrats will not go underground – after all they have enough money, including hard currency, the "commercial structures" they had prepared in advance, and last but not least, the KGB experience. Personally, I do not think that the party bosses who are used to the easy life will do that, as they need a personal limousine to drive them to an underground meeting, but the danger is there nonetheless.

There is one more aspect of the problem: political parties must judge themselves as the noble and popular Alexander Rutskoi did. The party headed by him publicly recognized the historical guilt of Communists, thus doing what the CPSU leadership refused to do for a long time.

Mikhail Gorbachev was also reluctant to acknowledge the party's guilt. It was with a feeling of horror that we listened to some of the answers he gave at the August 22 news conference, where he continued to well a length on the renewal of the CPSU and the socialist choice, and to argue with Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev. As for them, they never thought of the injustices done to them when they spoke up in defence of Gorbachev as early as August 19.

Naturally, Gorbachev behaviour can be easily explained: it is possible that by the time he was giving that news conference, he had not yet found out everything about the events of those days. Let us hope that Gorbachev will finally understand: in the tragic days of August no one was thinking about the socialist choice, for the choice was between life and death, freedom and slavery, honour and disgrace. It seems that Gorbachev started to understand this when he resigned as General Secretary on August 24 and urged the CPSU Central Committee to dissolve itself.

Today, it is not really important whether the Central Committee heeds the Gorbachev call. The party is dead. A new party can appear, of course. But it will be a party under a new name and pursuing new policies as one of the many political parties of new society which is being born before our very eyes. One should not fool oneself: the old structures are still strong and the old mentality and behaviour are still there.

The nation has undergone a real Transfiguration. Now it's the turn of the Communist Party.

A third Union

The old USSR is no more, but the new one due to be born on August 20 will not appear either. The USSR will never be the same again...

Marina Shakina

One satirical character was said to have recognized Soviet Russia a little bit later than Britain but a little bit earlier than Greece. This eloquent image of a cautious philistine and conformist primarily preoccupied with his own well-being comes to mind when I try to describe the reaction some Union republics displayed to the coup.

Making life easier for the republics...

Boris Yeltsin and other leaders of Russia made their choice two hours after the radio announced the formation of the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR (SCSE). I remember the shared feeling of anxiety as everybody waited for the republics to say their word and to make it obvious to the putschists that their plans had failed. The first ones expected to speak up were the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Kravchuk and Nazarbayev. The smart and likable Nazarbayev was the nation's third most popular politician after Gorbachev and Yeltsin. Hours passed but nothing comparable to the tough Yeltsin statement came from either the Ukraine or Kazakhstan. The gist of the reports coming in from the republics was that republican leaders issued cautious statements saying that no state of emergency was imposed in their republics, the republics were working normally and the situation there was tranquil.

Most republican leaders assumed the wait-and-see stance. The three Baltic republics and Moldova called the new regime unconstitutional and one republic that had intended to be one of the first signatories of the new Union Treaty, Azerbaijan, welcomed the establishment of the eight-member emergency committee.

In those days a number of foreign states, including the United States and Great Britain, expressed their support for Yeltsin and his followers, but there was something that the leadership of Russia needed more: declarations of support from the largest republics of the new Union – the Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan.

The days of the putsch presented the republican leaders and other characters in the drama with an alternative. The choice was between preserving calm in their own republics responsibility for the lives of the citizens of those republics, and good relations with Russia and commitment to democracy and law. In practice they might have failed to preserve either. If Russia had been supressed, the turn of the other republics would have come soon, too – this was evident to everyone. Did republican leaders bank on their skills for political manoeuvring? They hoped to stall the developments and to see what would come of it. Are the republics to blame for their having been passive, while Yeltsin alone was able to make the right decision? The republics do not seem to have lost anything: they happily avoided complications and stepped in when the junta's fate was sealed. They also brought their share of pressure to bear on the octet, and obviously influenced it not to storm the Russia White House which would have led to massive bloodshed.

On the morning of August 19 Yeltsin issued a statement in which he called the SCSE an unconstitutional body. Speaking at a press conference, Yeltsin said that the Ukrainian leader, Kravchuk, was about to make a similar statement too. In the evening of August 20 when the situation around the White House worsened and everybody was waiting for an attack, Yeltsin spoke over the radio broadcast from the White House. He sounded bitter but calm: the republics kept silent, the junta promised to make life easier for them, and the dictatorship's iron fist was aimed at Russia alone... Such was everybody's impression, but the reality was much more complicated. For example, addressing the MPs, Gorbachev said that General Varennikov who had come to his dacha in the Crimea together with other three SCSE envoys to demand the president's resignation had headed for Kiev immediately after the conversation with Gorbachev was over. Was Varennikov going to negotiate with Kravchuk? Or to make a deal? Or to threaten him? Undoubtedly, the junta brought pressure to bear on the republics, but it was not military pressure. The troops were deployed only in Moscow, large industrial centres in Russia and the Baltics. Nonetheless, the republics decided not to play with fire for the time being.

The Nine and the Six

The reality was much more complicated because the republics themselves were not unanimous in their silence. Who supported Yeltsin clearly and unconditionally? Not the leaders of the nine republics which were going to endorse the new Union Treaty, but some of the leaders of the six republics which had opted to stay out of the Federation. But not all of them. The radical democrat, President Zviad Gamsakhurdia of Georgia kept silent, and the Armenian leader, Levon Ter-Petrosyan issued only a vague statement. Taking into account the fact that the Communist Party was directly behind the putschists, one can see that even in the case of the octet's victory, the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, where local Communists' positions are quite stable, would have nothing to fear and would be perfectly able to cohabitate with the SCSE. As for the Ukraine, where the Communist Party is bitterly competing for influence with the pro-democracy movement Rukh, the situation was much more complicated...

In the Ukraine the parliamentary opposition immediately opposed the State Committee for the State of Emergency in the USSR, but the opposition is in the minority in the Ukrainian parliament. Vladimir Grinev, Deputy Chairman of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, said the junta was unconstitutional on the very first day of the coup.

"I regard the Ukrainian parliament's attempt to wait and see as a grave political error. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine spent two days in session and adopted an extremely vague resolution which said that the SCSE's decisions had no force in the Ukraine. This official position looked very improper. It was only later in the day

Soldiers leaving the Kaunas TV centre. The Commander of the Baltic Military District will never again interfere in the internal affairs of independent Lithuania...

of August 21 that Kravchuk talked to Anatoly Lukyanov over the phone and said that he did not support the committee and demanded that Gorbachev be returned to power," said Vladimir Grinev.

The Ukrainian pro-democracy movement Rukh refused to recognize the putschists, and the leader of the Western Ukraine, Vladimir Chornovil, sent a telegram of support to Boris Yeltsin. The conduct of the Ukrainian politicians in the days that followed the coup strongly affected their popularity ratings, and chances are that the results of the presidential elections in the republic will be different from what had been expected before August 19.

The wait-and-see attitude assumed during the coup is going to cost the republican leaders who had been and still are backed by the CPSU their positions of power. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of Byelorussia, Dementey, has already resigned and Kravchuk of the Ukraine, Mutalibov of Azerbaijan, and Shaymiyev of Tatarstan may have to follow suit soon.

The strong weak centre

The aborted coup has aggravated the domesltic political situation in all republics – frictions between the authorities and the opposition became stronger and interethnic relations worsened. The new factor of division is the support for or the refusal to support the SCSE. The most tragic consequence of the putsch is the fact that practically all Russian-speaking people living in the Baltics and Moldova readily supported and welcomed the coup. Retaliation came immediately. These republics have ceded from the Union for good. Communist party structures – the source of parallel power in those republics, have been dismantled. The command of the Baltic Military District will never again interfere in the internal affairs of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The Estonian government has sacked the directors of industrial enterprises controlled by the Union ministries, who had made up the leadership of the hard-line Interfront movement. The Moldovan government has embarked on a tough policy vis-à-vis the breakaway Dniester and Gagauz republics.

Russians living in other republics have long since found themselves between a rock and a hard place. They wanted to feel at home in the republics which had opted for national rebirth. They wanted a very simple thing: they wanted the Soviet Union to remain what it had been before. They did not approve of Yeltsin's policies and regarded the advent of the SCSE as a new hope. The leadership of Russia will now have to find a satisfactory solution to the problem of Russian people living out of Russia, otherwise the Russian-speaking segments in the newly independent republics will remain the fifth column and the social base for dictatorship attempts. The republics themselves must also be interested in a speedier solution to the Russian question, unless they want to complicate their relations with the great neighbour – Russia and preserve a constant breeding ground for conflicts at home.

Today the leaders of the Russian Republic are enthusiastically making the right decisions and taking the right steps. Their moral duty now is to help the Russian-speaking people in the republics – after all they are also to blame for the fact that the junta was supported in the predominantly Russian Tiraspol, Narva, and Salcininkai.

The old Union is no more, but the one that was to appear on August 20 will not ever exist either. Speaking at the victory rally in Moscow, Boris Yeltsin said the Union Treaty was to be signed as soon as possible, although a couple of articles would have to be revised. The republics which hesitated for three days during the coup are rushing to declare their independence. Republican Communist parties are withdrawing from the CPSU, local KGB bosses are being fired and state structures are hastily being departified. The putschists wanted to preserve the Union, but their demarche only accelerated the objective disintegration processes. The Novo-Ogaryovo draft of the Union Treaty will have to be radically revised and the rights of the centre will need to be minimized.

The putsch will undoubtedly affect the Union Treaty and its logic. I support the scheme "weak centre – strong republics." The Union must be weak enough not to become dangerous for the world and itself, and at the same time it must be strong enough to be able to defend itself and remain a single international entity. It must be strong for defence and weak for aggression. I see only one way – a confederation. Such is the opinion of the Ukraine's leading politician, Vladimir Grinev.

The short-term forecast may be as follows: the eye of political hurricanes will move to the republics which for some time will be entirely preoccupied with their own problems. Many political scientists agree that the main events will unfold in the Ukraine. For some time, the events will be governed by the aftershock of the putsch – declarations of independence, mutual recognition of independence, demolition of the Communist Party structures, revision of inter-republican relations, and change of leaders. Then the development will start to be affected by the economic process that will correct the republics' vision of their future and the road to take. Today it is difficult to predict what result will finally be produced as the Union Treaty – a confederation, a commonwealth, or something which so far has no political definition.

Three days that changed the world

Enthralled and hopefull, all of America closely followed the live reports from the Krasnopresnenskaya Embankment which showed the speeches of Boris Yeltsin and the defenders of freedom who surrounded the building of the Russian Parliament. All of America hails the victory of democracy in the Soviet Union and the restoration of legitimate power.

The previously suspended projects for technical aid, credits for the purchase of grain, and the process of ratifying the Soviet-American trade agreement have been renewed. Relations between Washington and Moscow have returned to normal.

The Americans expect that now the Soviet Union will finally make haste on the road to reform – even Bush felt it was necessary to mention this. In his opinion, the road is now open since the reactionaries have been removed from the political arena.

The lessons of the coup and how it affected Soviet-American relations and world politics were the subjects of my talk with former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and director of the Institute for East-West Security John Mroz, whose opinions about the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are respected in Washington.

Zbigniew Brzezinski. I am very happy. I was most impressed by the appearance of a new young generation devoted to democracy. On the first day of the coup people were not afraid to come before the TV cameras and give their names and condemn the putschists.

New Times. What lessons can be derived from these tragic events?

Z.B. The most important lesson is that the democratization of society in your country must proceed more decisively, more deeply, and on a broader scale. Now that the reactionary forces of the CPSU and KGB have been defeated and discredited, the unique possibility presents itself to realize the democratic transformation of the country. I have in mind the power of the people, the privatization and the demilitarization of society, and the recognition of the rights of individual republics desiring independence.

NT. Is it possible to say that the Soviet Union has passed the test of democracy?

Z.B. Of course. The devotion to democracy displayed by many Soviet people has elicited great sympathy.

NT. In the past in the eyes of Americans, Russia was frequently associated with totalitarianism and chauvinism. This time it was namely the Russian republic which played the leading role in foiling the attempt to establish dictatorship...

Z.B. This is one of the most glorious pages in the centuries-long history of Russia. Instead of oppression, she brought freedom not only to herself but also to the other peoples of the Soviet Union. Russia has every reason to be proud of this.



Zbigniew Brzezinsky: the devotion to democracy has elicited great sympathy

NT. Recently you said that the era of Yeltsin has begun in Soviet politics.

Z.B. I believe that Yeltsin has become a key political figure in Moscow. He played a decisive role in defeating the coup, and he was popularly elected. His program of radical reforms must be realized by the Soviet leadership resolutely and consistently. Now Gorbachev has no excuse for procrastination and compromises because of pressure from the conservatives.

NT. On the whole, what part did the US and the West play during the crisis in the Soviet Union?

Z.B. Our role was a responsible one, and it was effective to a certain degree. But the coup was suppressed thanks to Yeltsin's courage and the daring of young people, students, intelligentsia, and workers who were not intimidated by the putschists' threats of bloodshed and who were ready to sacrifice themselves in the name of democracy.

NT. What kind of influence do the recent events have on relations between the US and the Soviet Union?

Z.B. Your country now has the opportunity to fulfill the program for the democratic transformation of society. The West must act as the Soviet Union's partner in this.

I met with John Mroz in his office, which was full of books and souvenirs from the Soviet Union.

NT. President Bush stated that now US-Soviet relations will be strengthened.

J.M. It is very important for relations between our countries that the recent events have inspired in Americans, as in everyone else, a surge of sympathy for both Yeltsin and the Soviet people who courageously opposed the putschists. There has been a change in the way the inner strength of the Soviet character is viewed, especially that of the Russian soul. It is hard for Americans to picture your country, your people, your problems. But now they have a better understanding of the Soviet Union and feel a great warmth towards your country. Consequently, the American political view of the USSR will be more sympathetic. Your

country now has the opportunity to integrate even more quickly into the world economy, where it will occupy its proper place.

NT. Will there be a change in the United States' approach to rendering economic and technical aid to the Soviet Union?

J.M. I think that we must take a more positive stand on many questions. For example, the question of establishing a stablizing fund to ensure the convertibility of the ruble. I continue to attach great significance to the rendering of technical and expert aid. The Soviet Union is a country rich in human and mineral resources, they need only to be managed wisely. You can learn a great deal about economics from the West, especialy from its gross mistakes which must be avoided. Take for instance a national bank. This is neither a capitalist nor a socialist idea. Any country can have a national bank, but it is hard for me to imagine that in one country there could be ten national banks. Experience shows that this is simply not a viable system. Your country does not have to copy anyone, but it cannot ignore the experience of others.

NT. From my observations, it seems that there is a growing expectation that the Soviet Union will sharply reduce defence spending and end aid to Cuba...

J.M. Yes, this is so. I think that such a step on the part of the Soviet Union would also help us cut our military budget, even more thoroughly than we can now foresee.

NT. How does the future of the Soviet Union look to you now?

J.M. Right now many things remain unclear. For example, what kind of relations will exist between the republics in the future Union and will they demand further changes in the new Treaty of Union which should have been signed on Tuesday?

NT. As reported in the American press, the Russian President has already posed the question of the supplementary powers of the republics.

J.M. In my view, this is one of the inevitable consequences of the recent events in the USSR. Decentralization, or even the disintegration of the Union will be accelerating. The main question is how far can this go until the reverse process begins – integration on a new basis.

NT. Before uniting, separation is necessary?

J.M. Such is the natural dynamic of present events.

NT. How does America now view the future Union?

J.M. Just like in the past, we are not supporters of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. We have always respected the wills of the republics and their sovereignty, but we did not encourage them to withdraw from the Union.

We hope that the Soviet Union will be a stable, prosperous, democratic state. Such a Soviet Union would correspond to our national interests: as history demonstrates, democratic states rarely fight with each other. The USA will do all that it can to help transform the USSR into such a state. But the future of the Union is in your hands. The Soviet people themselves will determine it.

Americans think that thanks to the changes in the USSR, world politics as a whole have changed. This indicates the recognition of the world role of Russia-regardless of whether the Union survives or not.

Yevgeny Rusakov,
our own correspondent
NEW YORK

Democracy is not crushed

The political reforms begun by President Gorbachev inspired hope throughout the world. When the coup was attempted, we were seriously alarmed and wondered if all that had been achieved would be lost. These sentiments were expressed by Ingvar Carlsson, Prime Minister and leader of the Social Democratic Labour Party of Sweden, during a talk with a *New Times* correspondent.

Carlsson continued, stating that it doesn't have to be that way. It did not happen that way, and it cannot happen that way. It is no longer possible to smother democracy, which has struck deep roots. The Soviet people, like any people, want an atmosphere of freedom and democracy in which to formulate their future. We in Sweden will do whatever we can to support such developments. After surviving such hardship, the Soviet people deserve a free and democratic life.

The recent happenings show that freedom and democracy must be fought for constantly. The battle for their defence is our common cause. It is important for the people of Sweden to demonstrate that we stand on the side of freedom-loving forces. We continue to support the democratically elected leaders, presidents, and members of parliament of Russia, the Baltics, and other republics. Now the whole world bears the responsibility to help in the social and economic development of the Soviet Union. Today there is no time for hesitation.

Alexander Polukhov,
our own Correspondent
STOCKHOLM

MESSAGES OF GREETINGS TO THE JUNTA

YASSER ARAFAT, Chairman of the PLO Executive Committee, thinks that the overthrow of Gorbachev will help solve the tragic problems with which the Soviet Union is now faced. The PLO expects that the USSR will now play a new role in the Middle East, actively supporting a solution to the Palestinian problem and exerting pressure on Israel.

MUAMMAR AL-QADDAFI, leader of the Libyan revolution, head of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya. We are happy to congratulate you on your bold, historic action! We hope it will bring the USSR out of the fatal crisis into which it was thrown by widescale imperialistic conspiracies directed not only against the Soviet Union, but against all peoples of the world. Long live the revolutionary fight in the name of freedom, socialism, and peace.

SADDAM HUSSEIN, Chairman of the Soviet of revolutionary command, President of the Republic of Iraq, Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Renaissance Party. We hail the coup.

The jinnee has been let out of the bottle

The war is fought in the name of peace, and peace talks end in war

In Yugoslavia today the word "agreement" has a flavour of sensationalism. In an atmosphere of ethnic hostility and mistrust the news of an agreement is regarded with scepticism and mistrust. This also applies to the decisions of the country's Presidium (collective presidency) on cease-fires and the solution of the crisis. They are violated several days or even hours after they have been adopted, with each involved in the feud proclaiming its desire for peace and accusing the other side of aggressive action. A peculiar Yugoslav situation has arisen: the war is being fought in the name of peace and peace talks end in war.

What is the reason?

The Presidium is in many respects merely a formal body of state authority in Yugoslavia. Few people in the republics recognize it as the highest body and even fewer listen to what it says. The collective presidency reminds one of a discussion club, with each member firmly adhering to his own positon.

Many think that the key to a solution of the conflict is in the hands of leaders of the republics and that, given the desire, they could stop the bloodshed. Yesterday one could have agreed with this statement. Today it raises doubts, and tomorrow it will most likely be inconsistent with reality. The genie of the conflict has been let out of the bottle and the leaders of the republics are unable to drive it back. The decision making and exercising of uncontrolled power has dropped to the level of commanders of armed units which have become unmanageable.

This applies especially to the elite armed units of the feuding sides. The Croatians have national guards and Serbs special task forces. They are well armed. The "guards" wear American camouflage uniforms and high boots. There are a knife and a packet of a toxin in the pocket of boots and a flexible wire for strangling is attached to the shaft of the knife. Each "guard" wears a black head band. The Croatians are usually armed with Hungarian-made Kalashnikov assault rifles. The members of the Serbian special task forces also wear camouflage uniforms, but home-made. They are armed with weapons from the time of the WWII and with modern mortars. The members of the armed units of both sides are prepared to kill each other.

Human life is not valued in the conflict area, and this refers not only to peaceful civilians. Croatian "guards" each receive 1,000 German marks a month, while foreign mercenaries in their ranks get three times more. But, as one Croatian told me, "they can each be promised even 5,000 marks a month, because they will not live to get their pay. Foreign mercenaries are ordered first to attack Serbian villages."

There is perhaps one more, non-material, factor in the aggravation of the conflict. It is impossible to see it, but one constantly feels it. The atmosphere of hatred becomes an independent force and the war is a usual thing, a favourite daily pursuit for some people.

At present the conflict is limited mainly to Croatia. But with every passing day it threatens to become the detonator of new explosions. Croatia borders on the ethnically motley Bosnia and Herzegovina, a veritable powder-keg for ethnic conflicts. The Moslems, Serbs, and Croatians living in that republic are kept from the fatal strife by fear of self-annihilation. They understand that by its gravity and bloodshed an armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina will considerably exceed the current "Croatian war."

Now that the republics display a greater desire to break apart than to live in one state, the question of frontiers remains the main stumbling block between them. Their positions differ widely on this question. The Croatians insist firmly on the principle of inviolability of the existing borders between the republics. The Serbs do not agree with them, saying that the borders have been fixed by Tito's communist regime on the principle: "there are no strangers here, we are all one family and it is not important where the border passes." For this reason the border issue will be hard to settle. Ancient Romans said: "If the problem is insoluble it must be changed". In Yugoslavia the old maxim is so far ineffective.

Gennady Sysoyev,
our own correspondent
BELGRADE

Skirmishes are going on *Photo by Camera-Press – TASS*

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Dictatorships leave only ruins behind

Anatoly Medvedenko

The scenario of the recent events in this country, prepared by the State Committee for the State of Emergency, is easily recognized in other countries. In Latin America, it has been repeatedly staged

As far as I remember, that remote region of the world has invariably been described in the Soviet press as either "volcanic" or "stormy." And those epithets were not attributed to volcanoes, but rather to the explosive political situation in Latin America. This is due to the extremely active meddling of the armed forces in a field which is beyond their competence, that is, political affairs.

Indeed, over 600 coups, both successful and abortive, have taken place in the region in the 170 years since Latin American countries won independence.

Bolivia, for instance, has seen some 200 coups. There was a time in the history of this small poor country, when in the course of three days six generals replaced one another as the country's head. There is probably no other country which can claim to have been simultaneously ruled by three independent presidents (all of them generals), as was Bolivia in 1879.

The military could not disregard Argentina, one of the largest countries on the continent. Twelve presidents were elected there in general elections between 1916 and 1983. But only two of them served their full term envisaged by the Constitution. The rest were forced to leave La Casa Rosada (the Rose House), which is the residence of the country's leader, to generals, who were in power for 22 years during that period. It was Argentina which gave birth to the phenomenon of the 20th century, known in political parlance as "the Argentinization of the armed forces" of the continent.

The only exception to this rule is Costa Rica, which until recently was the only country on the continent which had no army, as it had been abolished under the 1949 Constitution. In June this year it was joined by Panama, which adopted an amendment to the Constitution banning the army "for good."

For many long decades Uruguay was considered a small island of lawfulness in the ocean of scheming and lawlessness and was called "the Latin American Switzerland," referring to the democracy in Uruguay. However, the military coup of June 27, 1973, deprived Uruguay of its exclusiveness and put it in the same rank with the other Latin American countries.

The same is true of Chile.

I won't dare to analyze all the reasons for the army's interference in political life, which is done on a scale typical only of Latin America. But some of them I will name.

First of all, the armed forces of the local countries were formed in the struggle for their independence from Spanish rule. "The Apostles of Freedom" – Generals Jose San Martin and Bernardo O'Higgins, Simon Bolivar and Antonio Jose de Sucre and others played an active role in their states' formation. It is not accidental that they still enjoy unique popularity.

But the process of the states' formation was coming to completion and the military was left aside, which did not suit some of the generals. They were used to the role of "Saviours of the Motherland" and were not eager to part with it. Moreover, that role not only satisfied their ambitions, but, more importantly, allowed them to determine the fate of society.

As for the civilian politicians who were in power, they were trying to clearly determine the role of the military in government structures and thought that it should carry out purely professional functions, that is, defend the country from foreign enemies.

In one of the talks a prominent Chilean political scientist Enrique Correa named another reason, which I would describe as the "Chekhov's gun phenomenon," the gun is known to fire sooner or later. What did he mean? The Chilean political scientist was trying to prove that any existing army is supposed to act and engage in some work which must lead to concrete, tangible results. An enormous quantity of highly educated, well-trained and armed experts are brought together to give the best years of their life, all their knowledge and their intellect to the perfection of skills which they most probably will never use. Gradually they start feeling that nobody needs them, or their professional knowledge and skills. Each one of them is like a journalist whose articles are never published and who continues working, though he knows that they will never be published, or like an athlete who keeps training all his life, but will never take part in a competition.

I believe that this thought is not groundless. Indeed, it does help explain artificially launched conflicts (because in this century Latin American troops did not take part in military operations apart from the shameful defeat of

Argentina. Relatives of the "disappeared" rally against the junta's crimes

Argentina in the war of the Malvinas, and the participation of some armies in American invasion of Grenada, and the Dominican Republic) like the problem of the Beagle Channel, when Argentina and Chile were drawn into a long and exhausting conflict over three small islands near Cape Horn. The argument enabled them to keep their troops in combat readiness.

But the main thing is that Latin American armies demonstrate "miracles of combat art" and prove themselves in the war against their own people. And they describe their actions as a "national salvation mission."

This philosophy was graphically illustrated by the "national security" doctrine, or as it is also called, the "internal front" concept. One of the documents explaining the doctrine says that "it is difficult to determine exactly the practical line between the state of war and the state of peace. The state of war is permanent." Thus, one can logically conclude that the entire country is enemy territory, and the people are the enemy that should be fought against permanently. In other words, the enemy is not outside, but inside the territory, and the main borders are not geographic, but ideological borders. Consequently, only authoritarian regimes (that is, military dictatorships) can oppose the enemy.

One cannot neglect the influence of the United States which closely followed the processes taking place south of the Rio Grande and was gradually laying its hands on the newly-born states of the continent. To this end it used armies which were hindering democratic processes in certain countries, not without "help" from the United States, and, though such pronouncements are not popular any more, these armies pursued the policy of their North American neighbour.

In the early 1980s, however, democratization began in Latin America, which continued all through the following decade.

And if you look at the map of Latin America, you will see a new picture, unknown throughout the entire history of the recently "volcanic" continent – in all countries of the region (with the exception of Cuba) the power is in the hands of popularly elected government bodies. This is unprecedented indeed.

How can one explain this phenomenon? Some political observers attribute it to a certain recurrence, where military regimes are allegedly periodically replaced with democratic governments. And now, they claim, is the time of democratically elected governments. But to my mind, the reason is universal discrediting of military dictatorship as a form of government.

Not only have presidents, dressed in general's uniforms, failed to solve social and economic problems, which was the goal of their coups, but they exacerbated them. This is true of all military regimes. (The only exception is Chile, but this topic needs a separate analysis.) To prove this, I will mention only one index – the foreign debt. In Uruguay during 11 years of military rule the debt increased eight-fold reaching 5.6 billion dollars. The cabinet of the current president of Panama, Guillermo Endara, inherited from the military regimes which had ruled the country for 21 years a foreign debt which at the beginning of this year was 6.2 billion dollars. This makes 2,670 dollars per capita of the population, and is the highest index of its kind in the world.

The countries that were ruled by military regimes have another common feature – cruel and senseless mass repressions, which were meant to help the generals stay in the president's chair.

But what is amazing is that neither mass repressions nor the cruelty of the military and its seeming omnipotence could suppress the opposition of people in Chile, Argentina and Uruguay.

Let's return to Argentina, since its example is the most vivid one in this respect.

Since the constitutional government came to power in December 1983, the military has repeatedly tried to attack the authorities, but all its attempts have been in vain. There are many reasons for this. But the main one, to my mind, is the mass demonstrations of Argentinians in support of the government and their readiness to defend the democratic regime even if it cost them their lives. And these are not just words. I witnessed one of these attempts in Buenos Aires in April 1987. I will recall only one episode. When the infantry school Campo de Mayo which is located some 30 km away from the capital refused to obey the president, hundreds of people from local villages literally burst onto the territory of the military settlement, bringing their children along, surrounded the mutineers and paralysed their actions. They stayed in Campo de Mayo until the arrival of Raul Alfonsin, who persuaded the soldiers to surrender.

So Latin America is free from dictatorial regimes. Of course, there is no need to simplify the political situation on the continent. However, we can conclude that in the past hundred-odd years of their existence military regimes have proved completely bankrupt. This is true even of Latin America, where the attitude towards the military is somewhat different.

BUENOS AIRES–MONTEVIDEO–SANTIAGO DE CHILE–MOSCOW

Budapest

When Arpad Göncz, a writer, translator and playwright, became the president of the Hungarian Republic a year ago, many people wondered what social or literary activities, which were known to a narrow circle of intellectuals, earned him the highest position in the country. The Western press interpreted the Göncz election as the confirmation of the universality of the Havel phenomenon, and some observers speculated that it was the result of behind-the-scenes deals between parties and parliamentary factions and agreed that the new president's would be a passive political role.

Much has changed since then. The ability to be above interparty disputes, to avoid political timeserving, and to see and represent true national interests have made Göncz one of the most authoritative leaders of today's Hungary.

A man who has lived a difficult life, the major milestones of which are reflected in his memoirs, Göncz turns to history not to highlight his own courage and vision, but to draw lessons from the complicated and sometimes tragic past of his country. There are lessons that may be useful for other nations to heed.

The reminiscences of 1956, including those of my own, begin with rather remote times. Without looking back at the past, it is impossible to understand the essence of what we call "revolution," our enemies call "counter-revolution," the West calls "insurrection," and the Hungarian emigrants call "struggle for freedom."

Arpad Göncz

In trying to understand the events of 1956, it is necessary to look back, not at the year 1849, when Hungary first attempted to free itself from feudal bonds and gain national independence to start building the foundation of a civil society in its already sovereign land (that attempt was aborted by the Russian army that came to salvage the domination of the Habsburg dynasty), but at the year 1944. More specifically, one must look at the end of the second world war, when the German army and several demoralized and poorly-organized Hungarian units desperately tried to defend Budapest, the last obstacle to the Red Army's relentless advance to the Austrian border...

It was not the Soviet Union which declared war against Hungary, but the Hungarian government which started fighting with the Red Army. Soviet troops entered Hungarian territory in pursuit of the retreating German units. This is an historical fact that cannot be doubted. But nor can it be doubted that the Hungarian people did not want that war. The hardships and sacrifices of war seemed senseless and alien to the real national interests of Hungary. The battle of Stalingrad made many Hungarians understand that the Hungarian government's unprovoked entry into the war was irresponsible. This did not mean, however, that the Hungarian people were not trembling before the "great alien" – the advancing Red Army (as they would tremble before any oncoming army), that they enthusiastically welcomed the occupation which could not fail to alter the familiar lifestyle, state system, and the traditional system of values.

1956

However, there was an active anti-fascist minority in the country (it did not include communists alone, by the way) which, guided by ideological and practical considerations, wanted to put a speedier end to the suicidal war that served the interests of the Third Reich. They were ready to fight the Germans (no matter what their government decided and even in defiance of the government's decisions) for the sake of ending the senseless bloodshed. I also belonged to that minority as a member of a students' resistance battalion and the anti-fascist organization Hungarian Students' Freedom Front, which was a potential ally of the Red Army. I say a potential ally because there was formed no real alliance. Although we had sent messengers across the frontline to ask Russians to indicate the place of front line crossing for us with flares, we received no signal. I was crawling around the neutral zone with a captured German machine gun and trembled as I anxiously waited to meet the first Kirghiz (for some reason I thought the first Soviet soldier I would meet would be a Kirghiz) to whom I had to explain somehow that I was not going to open fire on him. It was only five years later that I met one of the messengers who survived, he told me that the Red Army first welcomed them, treated them with vodka and then herded them to the Caucasus via a transit POW camp. As I have already said, the alliance was never formed. Evidently, it was naive to believe that such an alliance was possible in the context of a bitter war.

We had to cross the German lines back to our side and on our way we freed the village which we passed. I was wounded in the clash with the gendarmes. When we got back to Budapest, my comrades took me to my parents' home over the last bridge across the Danube which had not been blown up. Without documents and gripping a pistol with three cartridges left in the clip (I wanted to spare the last one for myself), I lay wounded in a coal cellar just a hundred metres from the Eastern and Western front lines. I wondered who would be the first to discover me there: a Nyilas patrol hunting for deserters, or a Russian soldier who would have some business in the cellar. It was a Russian who found me. He came to the cellar, pointed his gun at me and escorted me to captivity – a young man of the recruiting age and wounded, I could not explain to him that I had been waiting for him – my liberator – down in the coal cellar. I had to escape from him and three other Russian soldiers who arrested me later. It must be mentioned for the sake of justice that at that time vat of palinka could buy a train full of prisoners of war. The resulting shortage of POWs was then compensated for by people from the streets, irrespective of age or sex – after all, POW quotas had to be fulfilled.

The army that took over Budapest at the cost of exorbitant losses, the purpose of which an unbiassed onlooker could not understand, was a motley mixture of 17th-century cavalry (which had to provide for itself at the expense of the newly occupied territories) and the elite mechanized well-trained troops of the 20th century. The frightened population and the local voluntary "allies" did not wait for anything like that. However, it was that army that occupied Budapest and defeated Hungary in the bloody war Hungary did not need or want. This defined the future of the relations between the two countries for the immediate historical perspective.

After a series of escapes I managed to remain at home. Quite naturally, I felt like testing myself in political life. It was not difficult to engage in politics, what with the political vacuum and the total disintegration of the state machinery, was even less difficult for a Resistance fighter like myself. My venture into politics, however, happened under the auspices of the Smallholders' Party that won an absolute majority of votes at the free elections in the framework of the anti-fascist coalition. I did not associate myself with the Communist Party, and it surprised me (or should I say shocked me) that my former allies, young Communists with whom I had shared mortal risks in the name of a free and independent and democratic Hungary, began to regard me as an enemy a mere two years later. They were brave and honest people. It was difficult for me to

understand why our relations changed so drastically. Later I was equally unable to understand how those enthusiastic young lads, mostly coming from families of workers and peasants, turned into cold-blooded lieutenants of the regime, intimidated victims, cynical judges at show trials and those who survived – into corrupt and greedy bourgeoisie. Anyhow, after the communists had seized power – which was not a painless process by itself – people of my type had to understand that all that we had fought for was annulled (if not in words, then in deeds), moreover, even my former participation in that struggle became a source of danger for me. In 1948-53, words were turned inside out: liberation started to mean lengthy occupation; revolution and democracy meant the system of administration by command; land reform meant forced collectivization; human dignity unconditional obeying of orders. Even Christmas was transformed into the holiday of Santa Claus, which had never been a part of the Hungarian national tradition. August 20 – the centuries-old holiday of Hungarian statehood and its founder King Istvan the Saint and also the holiday of new bread traditionally celebrated in Hungary on Peter and Paul's Day – was declared the Day of the Constitution, and few people in the country ever understood why the Constitution should be celebrated at all. The relations with the neighbouring superpower, the Soviet Union, instead of being based on mutual sympathy, respect, sober and clear mutual interests (like the relations with Finland, for example), became irrational: schoolchildren were taught that only he who loves his other Motherland, the Soviet Union, was the real patriot of Hungary, and he who loved only Hungary was a chauvinist. At the same time, numerous watchtowers and barbed wire fences separated people on both sides of the Soviet-Hungarian border.

The country with a population of ten million had to master the ideology-laden language in which the meaning of words the people had used since time immemorial radically differed from the traditional one. The symbols of the bright future – the two-thirds drop in the standard of living, and the symbols of abundance – the barren wheat fields, were supposed to be welcomed with a standing ovation.

Then Stalin died, and "Stalin's best disciple, the wise father of all Hungarians" Rakosi had to go. Rakosi did not only trample upon the human dignity, traditions, and customs of the Hungarian people, he also ruined the nation's economy. Unexpectedly, Moscow appointed Imre Nagy prime minister of Hungary. A miracle happened: for the first time in five years Imre Nagy described the events for what they were. Millions of people wept as they listened to radio broadcasts. Then, after three years of inner party squabbles Rakosi, who had been tempered in the Moscow purges, managed to phase Nagy out of power again. The year 1956 came.

The year 1956 came with the crack down on the writers who had been peacefully gaining strength; with unofficial circles of young people; with Zoltan Kadaly's cantata "No one touches a Hungarian unpunished!" (these are the words of Zoltan Zrinyi, a hero of the Hungarian struggle against the Turkish yoke), with the singing of the lyrics of Petofi's famous "Song of the Wolves;" with a pro-democracy movement composed of intellectuals, some pro-Nagy party functionaries and journalists. A teacher, a member of the Communist Party, could openly tell Rakosi: "You are a murderer and you must resign" and get away with it. It was not poverty that shocked the nation, but the lies, the misrepresenting of the nation's past, the breaking of traditions, the contempt for human dignity, truth and justice. It was not a hungry rebellion that was maturing in Hungary in 1953-56. Russian people who lived through Stalin's rule may think that the events in Hungary in 1948-53 were nothing compared to the Stalin outrage. Although the repressions of kulaks, frame-up trials against Communists and non-Communists, imprisonment, deportations, dispossession and stripping of civil rights affected at least one third of Hungary's overall population, the number of victims cannot be compared with the millions of people killed in the USSR under Stalin and the number of mass graves in the USSR. The labour camps of Vorkuta in the USSR and Recsk in Hungary cannot be compared. The Hungarian Gulag may seem modest. Why was Hungary the country where the revolutionary protests erupted? Perhaps it was so because however profound the economic changes might be in Hungary (in comparison with the semi-feudal economic order some of the socialist changes in Hungary were quite positive), they were not backed by the reality of the popular October Revolution that justified any changes in the eyes of the people, nor by the great sacrifice of the Great Patriotic War. This was the sign of the times. Hungary was familiar with the practice, but not the roots of Stalinism; the Hungarian emigrants who lived in Moscow were the only ones who knew the Soviet reality from the inside; the myth of invincibility had not been formed around Stalinism. The still viable concept of "a common fate" had not (and could not have, at that time) taken root in the two countries living under the Stalinist yoke. Everything that happened in Hungary in 1948-53 and after the defeat of the revolution was fixed in the public awareness – unsaid and in a crude form – as imported terror based on imported lies. It is not surprising in this light that during the "overture" of the revolution, at the well-disciplined students' demonstration of solidarity with the Poles held on October 23, the demonstrators cut out the Stalinist emblem that had replaced the ancient Hungarian emblem on the red-white-green national flag. The tricolor with a hole in the centre will remain for years as the ultimate symbol of the Hungarian revolution. On the same day, thousands of people gathered outside the parliament building to demand that Imre Nagy become prime minister again. The people wanted their prime minister to be that communist leader who had been the first to stop the terror of lies. However, as a disciplined party member Nagy made the crowds wait for two hours – that was time enough for him to lose the control over the developments for the next several days and for good. In the evening, a raging crowd of Budapest residents supported by a Hungarian armour regiment took to the streets (the military were addressed with the calls: "Don't shoot at your mothers, don't shoot at your compatriots!") and toppled the gigantic monument of Joseph Stalin. This gave the then General Secretary of the Communist Party Erno Gero (a murderer known under the alias of Pedro during the civil war in Spain) reasons to call the demonstrators "fascist scum." This added fuel to the fire. The reaction came immediately. The crowds took guns away from Hungarian soldiers and policemen and started storming the offices of the Hungarian Radio and the central party newspaper, which were the main sources of lies at that time. The radio broadcasting facility was located outside the city and only a temporary radio station was broadcasting from the parliament building. This made the storming of the Radio Centre senseless, but nonetheless it resulted in casualties from both sides. The consequences of the storming were felt the following day: the Soviet military intervention and the imposition of a state of

A street scene in Budapest

emergency. Imre Nagy became prime minister, but the real power continued to remain in Gero's hands. The real power?

Let us now address the events in chronological order. On **October 24**, the first workers' Soviets appeared in Budapest and the provinces: these were the first real bodies of Soviet power. The city was celebrating. Soviet tanks were surrounded by crowds, Soviet enlisted men who were seeing a revolution for the first time in their life were enthusiastold what exactly they were witnessing. Hungarian flags were flying over the tanks and the Hungarian national emblem was chalked on the armour. Suddenly the tankmen received the order to open fire, and the rebels started fighting back here and there.

The Hungarian Radio broadcasting from the cellars of the parliament building issued hourly calls against the revolution. It begged, pleaded, flattered, explained, threatened, seduced, and warned (think twice about it, or else there will be no football match on Sunday). By that time the blood of 250 people had already been spilt on the streets of Budapest.

On **October 25**, a peaceful demonstration was fired upon from the roof of the Ministry of Agriculture. The official figure of the victims did not exceed 100, but in the evening, 820 bodies were brought to the graveyards, and an unknown number of wounded people died later.

On **October 26**, the strikes spread from Budapest to the provinces: workers' Soviets and revolutionary committees were being set up everywhere. A demonstration came under attack in the small town of Mosonmagyarovar, and the result was 100 more deaths. It cannot be said that the imposition of a state of emergency did not produce any results, but it did not improve the situation. Realizing this, "the law-enforcing agencies" issued a statement in the afternoon of October 26, which said, in particular, that "bloodshed had to be stopped." Remarkably, the words "merciless liquidation of fascist bands" were replaced by the phrase "fratricidal massacre." The National concord government headed by Imre Nagy was formed.

On **October 27**, the names of the new government members were announced: a conglomerate of long-discredited Stalinists and trustworthy politicians. The situation in Budapest remained calm. The official statement said that "groups of hooligans (not fascists) had been suppressed in Budapest." Most "hooligans" were young people. Three days later, they formed the bulk of the National Guard which started to maintain law and order together with the police and the army. Reckless boys are the favourite characters of Budapest folklore. "Why didn't the Soviet Union occupy Romer Floris street?" – "Because there is a kindergarten in the one end of it and a school in the other." "Auntie, may I shoot from your window, please?" – "You're welcome to, but be sure to wipe your feet before you enter." Two boys are having a chat: "Where do you serve?" – "In heavy artillery." – "Wow! Where did you get five-litre bottles?" (a transparent hint at the "Molotov cocktail"). The All-Hungarian Association of Trade Unions declared: "The dream of the working class has come true. Workers' Soviets will be running the plants."

On **October 28**, the government yielded to the most insistent demand and Imre Nagy declared that the Soviet troops would be pulled out of Budapest and the hated state security organs would be disbanded. There were no reasons to continue the senseless and lengthy fighting, and the conditions of the cease-fire were observed. The Soviet commandant of the city of Gyor proclaimed that he believed "the struggle of the Hungarian people against the leaders-oppressors was justified." The Soviet commandant also expressed gratitude to the city authorities for the latter's rendering assistance to families of servicemen: acting on their initiative, the Gyor authorities sent forty litres of milk to Soviet servicemen's children. While secret police opened fire on crowds in the large industrial centre of Miskolc in northern Hungary. The result was more innocent victims and lynching on the part of the crowd.

On **October 29**, the Imre Nagy government moved from the premises of the Central Committee to the parliament building. Villages were sending free food to Budapest hospitals and factories.

At dawn of **October 30**, the Soviet troops pulled out of Budapest only to form a ring of steel around it. Hysterical crowds ransacked the offrices of the Budapest city party committee looking for the torture chambers of the secret police. 24 people, including Imre Nagy's comrade, Imre Mezo, got killed. The new government lifted the mandatory farming tax in kind. Political parties dissolved in 1948 were restored. The workers' committee of the region of Szabolcs-Szatmar bordering on the USSR declared: "Let us be patient and wait until the Soviet troops withdraw: then we will send a bunch of flowers from the grave of the fallen Hungarian freedom fighters with the last Soviet soldier to the people of the Soviet Union. We are doing this not out of wrath or vengeance, but to show that such method of Stalinism as a lie is still practised in the Soviet Union. The Soviet people were deceived when Hungarian freedom fighters were called counter-revolutionaries." Imre Nagy issued an appeal to the nation: "It is with a sincere and intense feeling of love that I address you, my Hungarian brothers. The revolution of which you are the heroes has triumphed. Today we are starting the negotiations on the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops."

To be continued

News from Africa



Africa: too much weaponry, too little food

Drawing from the magazine Jeune Afrique

This issue of *The World Paper* deals with Africa – the continent which continues to be overlooked by the world press

Those who confine newspaper reading to looking through headlines may get the impression that Africa is the vicious region of the Third World. Such an impression is formed against the background of the colossal problems the African continent is facing. However, the constant usage of the black paint in portraying African problems is fraught with the danger that such portrayals may become prophetic. At the same time, the positive developments on the continent continue to be ignored.

Actually, the Europeans have a lot to learn from Africa: for example, the forms of social organization and human relations that have allowed the peoples of Africa to survive in the past difficult 20 years. The European source of culture is nearly exhausted, while the African one will still be plentiful for years to come...

In the past thirty years, "development" in Africa has been going on without the Africans' participation and without due respect for their interests. This form of development has proved a fiasco. Now the Africans are starting to take development in their own hands. This creates a great, although fragile, hope for a better future of the continent.

A continent awakens to pluralism and hope

There is good news from Africa. The good news is that people are awakening from years of slumber under authoritarian rule to take their future into their own hands; to make their own history.

The bad news is that certain regimes which have enjoyed absolute power over "terrorized natives" are reluctant to let go and are doing all they can

to turn back the clock of history.

The advocates of the one-party system in Africa argue that traditional African societies were always akin to the one-party system. Tanzania's former long-ruling president, Julius Nyerere, remains the adamant advocate of this view. People like Nyerere have advanced arguments to support the one-party view:

– the one-party system would promote national unity;

– people's efforts would be directed toward nation-building and not wasted on politics;

– since the people were generally agreed that the government was to engage itself in development, party politics was not necessary;

– whatever differences would emerge, these could be freely discussed under the one-party regime as democracy and human rights would be practised.

The record, however, shows that one-party regimes, including Nyerere's in Tanzania, have generally failed on all four counts. They cannot claim any more national unity than in conditions where multiple parties have existed. Botswana, a multiparty state since independence and as ethnically homogeneous as Somalia, is a much more prosperous and united nation today than Somalia, which has degenerated into clan wars due to 20 years of misrule under Siad Barre's one-party dictatorship.

No one-party regime in Africa can boast of democratic practice or a good record on human rights: Sekou Toure's Guinea had its own Gulag Archipelagos; Mobutu's Zaire excelled in repression as a policy in maintaining a kleptocratic regime in power; and Banda's Malawi has been the best-run police state in Africa.

The African people are saying that governments are there to serve them; they are not there to serve governments. This is the basic democratic demand that people like Nyerere do not understand. The state must then listen to them and implement their ideas. This is what democracy is all about. To be governed and yet to control our governors, as playwright George B. Shaw once put it.

The multiparty advocates are looking for qualitative changes that will lead to truly representative and accountable governments. The oligarchs in the one-party regimes are looking into new ways and means of maintaining their privileges by rationalizing one-party authoritarianism even in the face of its popular rejection.

If there is any one thing that has retarded development in Africa during the last 30 years, it is nothing but bad, irresponsible, corrupt and unimaginative government of all political hues, both military and civilian types.

As Hamlet told Ophelia in Shakespeare's *Hamlet*, one feels like telling these governments: "Get thee to a nunnery: why wouldst thou be a breeder of sinners?"

Only this time we shall tell them: Get thee to the democratic ballot box, and stop pretending you are governing by the people's mandate.

P. Anyang' Nyong'o
NAIROBI,
KENYA

A model for a new Africa

"If yesterday I fought you as an enemy, today you have become a friend and ally with the same national interest, loyalty, rights and duties as myself. The wrongs of the past must now stand forgotten!"

These words, uttered by President Robert Mugabe to a dumbstruck audience at Zimbabwe's independence celebrations in 1980, are the essence of this country's miraculous transition from white settler colonialism to black majority rule.

Many blacks, who constitute 98 percent of the population, feel that the economically powerful white minority has only superficially subscribed to the philosophy of reconciliation to protect their material interests.

Yet few countries in the world which went through the sort of bitter war that Zimbabwe experienced before achieving its independence from Britain can claim to have done so with so little retribution.

The white former prime minister Ian Smith – responsible for incarcerating Mugabe for over a decade – still resides freely in the country. Thousands of whites who left in a huff have come back.

Race has ceased to be the dominant political force. Economic infrastructure has been maintained.

Zimbabwe's experience has pertinent regional implications. Zimbabwe learned moderation from the experience of Mozambique and Angola, which became independent before Zimbabwe, and found themselves in a shambles after departing white settlers destroyed everything in their exit path.

Now, says Zimbabwean economist Norman Reynolds, President Mugabe's policy of reconciliation "is the best gift which Zimbabwe can hand on to Namibia, and which, in turn, Namibia can pass on to South Africa."

A question that has baffled many a historian here is why Mugabe, regarded as one of Zimbabwe's most hardline nationalist leaders, opted for the olive branch.

But Mugabe, despite his firm convictions, has always been guided primarily by pragmatism. Having accepted this reality, however, he went all out to assuage white fears. Shortly after independence, the president – who holds six university degrees – met with many key whites. John Brown, a former president of the powerful, largely white Commercial Farmers Union, recalls atttending one such meeting.

"I was able to appreciate," he says, "that we had a man who could take control of the situation. Of course, we have all had to adjust. But I for one have no doubt about being a Zimbabwean – I am not a visitor here."

Self-interest undoubtedly had much to do with the decision by many whites to stay.

"They are here physically, but not spiritually," commented Zimbabwe's award-winning novelist, Chenjerai Hove, in a recent interview in an African magazine.

This assertion is supported to some degree by the number of whites who have returned to the country after independence. Most of the returnees have come back from South Africa or the United Kingdom, where they found they can't afford the same luxurious lifestyles as they can here.

Yet, despite threats to abolish the white seats before the prescribed year (1987), Mugabe once more let his head rule over his heart. During the 1990 elections, the first held on a nonracial basis, three whites stood as ZANU candidates and won. Three of Mugabe's 22 cabinet ministers are white.

Zimbabwean politics, once dominated by race, has become far more issue-oriented.



VISA MAKES THE WORLD GO ROUND

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During the 1990 elections, the CAZ backed a new party, the Zimbabwe Unity Movement, formed to challenge the government's headlong drive to form a one-party state. This issue has ben taken up vigorously by both black and white Zimbabweans.

On the economic front – whatever its other "costs" – reconciliation has allowed Zimbabwe to maintain intact its considerable infrastructure and diversified economy, the envy of many other African countries.

Whites still occupy key positions in the private sector. But according to Zimbabwean economist Joe Foroma, black Zimbabweans can now be found in almost every sector of the economy.

The most crucial economic "legacy" that Zimbabwe confronts today is land distribution. With the expiry of restrictive clauses in 1990, the government has said it plans to acquire half of all present white-owned farmland at prices it determines.

Although white farmers have reacted angrily to the proposals, none of the 4,500 farmers have left. "We have learned," muses one, "that this is a government we can work with. As Zimbabweans, we will sort something out."

Colleen Lowe Morna
HARARE, ZIMBABWE

The black man's heavy burden

African nations clamored for a new world – economic – order. But the world did not seem to notice that Africa was being smothered by debt. Millions of people and over 50 nations are inching back into prehistoric standards of living.

The West calls it debt crisis; Africans call it the black man's burden. Statistics show Africa's plight is a calamity. By 1985, Africa owed Western banks $53 billion. Within another five years, during which almost all caved in to IMF- and World Bank-instigated economic reforms, the debt bloated to over $230 billion, a sum equal to three times Africa's yearly export earnings.

To compound problems, as the continent's indebtedness increases, export prices depreciate. In 1980, for example, sub-Sahara Africa's debt was $57 billion, and the region's exports fetched over $50 billion. But eight years later the debt had pole-vaulted to $138 billion while export earnings had shriveled to $35 billion.

The telephone, for instance, has progressed beyond the copper wire era to the optic fiber age, leaving Zaire's huge copper reserves to rot. The former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, put it succinctly: it now costs more tons of sisal (a white fiber used in cords and twine) to buy fewer tractors. As with Tanzania's sisal, so it is with Ghana's coca, Congo's rubber and Côte d'Ivoire's pineapple.

As these countries continue to suffer export earning constraints, they are forced to spend about 30 percent of their export earnings on interest payments, not repayment. So there is a constant outflow of money from poor to rich nations.

African governments have embarked on World Bank- and IMF-administered Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) including withdrawal of real or imagined government subsidies, trade liberalization, currency devaluation and increased prices without corresponding wage increases.

In every country the result is almost the same: hyper-inflation and the death of small-scale industries suffocated as imports of luxury items, from limousines to Rolex watches, compete for foreign exchange with school textbooks, industrial spare parts and health care essentials. Unfortunately, some point to the availability of goods as proof that austerity measures imposed on Africa are a wonder pill. But availability adds nothing to quality of life if goods are unaffordable.

People have risen again and again in Nigeria, Zambia, Senegal and other countries for the "traditional anti-IMF demonstrations."

The crisis is not just cold statistics. As the crime rate soars and prostitution becomes the norm for female students (perpetuating AIDS), the skilled and unskilled flee West. The situation has worsened over the past 10 years. Not only have incomes fallen but services have deteriorated. In places where a decade ago there were schools and medical centres, no education or health care is available.

The United Nations International Children's Education Fund (UNICEF) put it starkly: "Over 1,000 people die daily (from poverty) in Africa," while up to 50 million children are likely to die between 1985 and 2000. The World Bank estimates that 280 million people, especially in the rural areas, live in abject – a key word – poverty.

It is easy for rich nations to deny responsibility; death by debt may even seem just punishment for the incompetence, larceny and profligacy of African leaders. No place has been as misruled as Africa. But as General Joseph Garba, ex-Nigerian foreign minister and ambassador to the UN and former resident of the UN General Assembly, said in a lecture at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, creditors tend to blame African domestic policy, minimizing the influence of natural disasters such as droughts and desertification and the unbalanced political and economic structures inherited from a colonial past.

While Africa is left to sink or swim, Eastern Europe is being nursed, just as Europe was resuscitated after World War II. Eastern Europe will receive its own economic largess with the establishment of a $1 billion European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Such a commitment to Africa's economic well-being has yet to take place.

The debt crisis needs to be seen as a global problem and tackled as such. Africa and Latin America owe the West over $640 billion, putting the West in danger too in case of a concerted default. Even without a default there is danger.

Bank failures are no cause for joy but they show the need for a combined effort between creditors and the debtors to find a just solution to the problem. One both sides could live with.

Now, it is uncertain whether the West will write off the debt or continue to suck the blood of African peasants. What seems certain is that Africa, caught as it is in this trap, cannot repay a debt as she is barely able to survive with prevalent sharecropping. Whatever happens, the consequences will be felt around the globe.

Tony Eluemunor
LAGOS, NIGERIA

THE CONTEMPORARIES' PORTRAITS

During the last 20 years I have unhurriedly drawn portraits of people who lived next door to me, of whom I was afraid, or who aroused my curiosity. Thus I have collected a long series of portraits called "The contemporaries' portraits"

Boris Zhutovsky was born in Moscow in 1932. For many years he illustrated books and drew pictures which he then "shelved," so to speak. In 1962, Zhutovsky was one of the abstractionists whose exhibition was excoriated by Khrushchev. It was the beginning of an attack against other workers in the field of culture and arts

Mother

Boris Zhutovsky

On October 8, 1947, my mother, Nina Ivanovna, went to our neighbours to borrow some potatoes. Food was rationed at that time. As for potatoes, they were planted on various plots of land, or bought on the market. Townsfolk usually laid in a store of potatoes in autumn, because they were cheaper then – 15 rubles for kilo – and not frost-bitten, We bought a sack or two of potatoes and kept them in old winter coats in another room. The house was not heated well, and our family of three lived in one room. We paid 2,000 rubles to an electrician to instal a device in the electric meter. Thanks to it the meter switched off and we could freely use electricity without having to pay for it. We heated our room with the aid of small cooking ranges and put pots with hot water on the window sill. Though the holes in the window were filled with cotton wool and sealed up with papers, we also rolled up quilts and laid them out along the holes.

When shirts, underclothes and bed sheets were hung on the line in another room after washing, drops of water which fell from the linen froze on the floor. The linen was washed by old nanny Annushka and Aunt Onya, my grandmother's sister. Before the revolution Onya had sold postcards and was a very proud woman. My mother asked her to wash our linen because she was suffering from hunger during the war. Onya's husband, Uncle Vitya, had been an officer before the revolution. During the revolution he served in the headquarters of Cossack general Shkuro. Once, when a Red was taken prisoner by White Guards, it turned out that he had studied together with Uncle Vitya in one military college, and Uncle Vitya helped him to escape from captivity. Before the Reds finally won, the college fellow saved Uncle Vitya and Aunt Onya from the threat of being shot. He even helped them to change their surnames.

Their son Tolka volunteered for front-line duty straight out of school on the second day of the war (in June 1941). Uncle Vitya could not endure that and soon died. Aunt Onya collected whatever food she could get and sent food parcels to her son and suffered greatly from hunger. Onya and my grandmother would drink tea with herring heads while in her woodshed were frozen chopped beet tops in barrels. Her son Tolka returned from the front line. He was wounded in action and could not find work for a long time. The war was over, but it was difficult to get a well-paid job. He wore his field shirt, only without shoulder straps, and tied his boots with a rope, because they were about to fall apart. I felt hungry because we had not yet bought potatoes on the market, or perhaps mother kept them for winter. That's why she went to borrow potatoes...

Several plain-clothes men were conducting a search in the flat of our neighbours. They rummaged through clothing and other things and took down notes on their sheets of paper. Neighbours with frightened eyes huddled in the corners. My mother was ordered to sit on a stool near the rack. She sat for a while, but then her patience ran out. In general, she did not have much patience. It was

Abridged version.
B. Zhutovsky ©



time for her to cook dinner, so she told one of the plain-clothes men, evidently the eldest of them: "My husband and son are waiting for me. They will start looking for me." The plain-clothes man did not say anything. He looked through his papers and asked my mother to sign one and then let her go, but not for good, as it turned out later.

> By the last year in school we understood that we should learn what we were told and that it was dangerous to know the truth

Klara Moiseyevna, the neighbour whose flat was searched by plain-clothes men, came to us the next morning and said that her youngest daughter Vera was taken away. That morning the neighbours did not yet know the reason for the arrest. Later she was told that her daughter Vera was an American spy.

The family of Klara Moiseyevna lived in a two-room flat. It was a luxury paid for in blood. Her elder son was shot by British troops during the Civil War as a Baku commissar. I do not know whether indeed he was a commissar. The point is that the history of our country was grossly distorted. By the end of our school education we wondered one thing: we should learn everything as we are told, and that it was even dangerous to know the truth. We fell out of the habit of trying to learn the truth. Only now we understand what defective people this system brought up. At that time there were "enemies" all around. Cautious goodwill then united people and helped them to survive. It was impossible for those who lived alone to survive. This could be done only by maniacs for whom survival was the sole concern. Later, when the screws had been loosened, the fury of survival proved excessive for them and the people around began to shun their excesses. Whoever has more than enough arouses envy, and envy breeds hatred. When you are an ideological fool and sunrise is an ideological event for you, suspicion is inevitable.

Stalin's car passed by our house on the way to his cottage in the country. All houses on the left side of the Kutuzovsky neighbourhood through which he rode belonged to the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs) and plain-clothes men could be seen in all gateways and at corners. Their life was wretched, because they constantly had to discover enemies somewhere. They had to earn their living that way. They were usually issued new clothes for a new season a little late, so their unseasonable outfit was their first hallmark, so to speak. For instance, under the hot summer sun plain-clothes men still wore high boots or rubbers. This is how we recognized them. By the time I finished my studies, our school dropouts could also be seen in gateways and at corners. They naturally looked arrogantly at their former schoolfellows and did not respond to their greetings.

Once I came across a schoolmate standing at the corner of a mechanized community kitchen. "What are you doing here?" I asked with surprise. "Go, go, it's forbidden to make inquiries here," he replied with an air of importance. A year ago that very boy had had copied the answers to a test from my excercise book.

Farther from the Kutuzovsky Avenue, on the Poklonnaya hill, plain-clothes men could be seen in all ravines. On the way from Moscow to Stalin's country cottage there were plenty of cast-iron boxes with telephones in order to report suspicious persons.

Klara Moiseyevna was an old red-haired and stooping Jew from Baku. She was a very clever and kind woman. She did not speak Russian well and we kidded her about it. Klara Moiseyevna had three sons and three daughters. The eldest son was shot by British troops in the Krasnovodskaya desert, on the fringe of the Kara-Kum desert. Her family was compensated for the death of her son. Klara was given a flat in the Kutuzovsky Avenue in Moscow. Some time earlier the Smolenskaya road had passed through it. The district had the Dorogomilovskaya Gate and Russian and Jewish cemeteries, the oldest in Moscow, with a church and a synagogue. We played hooky, spending our time on the high bank of the Moscow River.

Multistory blocks of flats have been built by the Communist Party's Central Committee on the site of the cemeteries, and only three poplar trees in one of their yards stand as reminders of the Jewish cemetery. On the left side of the present Kutuzovsky Avenue, there was a branch of the two cemeteries. Only four small granite poles have remained of it opposite the military registration and enlistment office. The nearby public garden, metro station, flower bed and trees have also been laid on the bones.

Klara's middle son Dolya went to America during the turbid revolutionary years. He was impelled simply by curiosity. He grew up and lived there till the late 1930s. But then he became homesick and returned to the Soviet Union. In Moscow, he got a translator's job in the American Embassy. Hardly any Soviet citizen would dare work there of his own will. Dolya knew nothing about the previous terrible years and began to work in the American embassy. Of course, he should have been warned that it was dangerous to do so. Perhaps someone told him or was afraid to tell, it is hard to say now.

Dolya worked in the embassy till October 1947. The security bodies put him down as the chief spy, while his sister Vera was considered his accomplice, simply because she began to learn English. It was said that Dolya had left behind his wife and a son. He could visit them later. But it was too late, as is everything in our country. Perhaps this is so because of its vast territory.

Klara's youngest son lived in Baku. By the time I met him he was already an adult and a factory manager. He had spent his youth organizing Young Pioneer and Young Communist League meetings, building plants and carrying out the five-year plans. He was building socialism with the fury of a man uncertain of himself.

On the one hand, he was the brother of a hero, a dead hero, and so there was almost no danger that one day he would be declared an enemy. This was said aloud and probably because of this he was elected to various bodies and entrusted with different tasks. He kept mum about the brother who lived in America but felt fear in his heart. His hope was that other people forgot about his brother, or thought that he had already died. But some people did not forget and collected or invented evidence. Fabrications could then be used as the basis for charges. The struggle against "enemies" became the occupation for many while class consciousness replaced education.

The elder daughter of Klara Moiseyevna lived in Leningrad. She was married to a sculptor, who together with another sculptor, had erected a lot of monuments to Lenin, Stalin and Ordjonikidze all over the country. He had also built a lot of monuments to Kirov so that others would not accuse him of being prejudiced. I never saw Klara Moiseyevna's elder daughter, but the sculptor came to Moscow often. On the staircase, he usually chewed cigarettes and praised my drawings. There was nothing to praise, of course, but he evidently thought it would be better for him to praise them.

Two of Klara Moiseyevna's daughters lived with her. The middle daughter, Ida, was in the army during the war, and on May 9, Victory Day, she pinned her medal ribbons on her chest. Ida lived alone and worked in a hospital. She smoked cigarettes with wool and lived in one room with mother. During the years when Vera was in prison she brought up her son Igor, a strange boy who was afraid of darkness and tormented his kitten.

Vera had a husband who fought on the front line and returned home. The soldiers returned tired, emaciated and wounded. War veterans, some with red and yellow stripes on their chests indicating the degree of injury, became hysterical at every trifle and cut line in shops. It was difficult to understand then who really fought, or who merely pretended that he fought against the enemy. Vera's husband Naum returned home plump, with the rank of officer and with several armchairs and pictures as trophies. He was occupied with the lighting of schools. True, other people did not care about that. There was not enough bread, male teachers still wore their field shirts because they could not buy suits, and some fainted from hunger.

Later, as I have already mentioned, plain-clothes men conducted a search in our flat. One of them then called my mother to various places and came to our flat. He tried to persuade her to confirm that Vera was a spy. My mother asked, staring at him: "Judge for yourself. Why should Vera engage in spying? Her husband has returned from the war, her mother is alive and her son is healthy? What else does a woman need?" The plain-clothes man said: "I see, Nina Ivanovna, you are a bold woman, but don't forget that you have a son."

When Naum learned about the visits of plain-clothes men, he asked my mother to agree with them. He had divorced Vera because she was a "spy." He was probably ordered to do something else, because he was not fired and remained in the party.

It is not clear why they did not arrest my mother. Perhaps they felt sorry for her or had already arrested enough people on that case.

My poor mother. She has had a hard life. She was four years old when the First World War began. Her father went to the front, while her mother, Maria Ivanovna, remained alone. She visited her sisters and brothers. There were a dozen of them and all worked on the railway in various capacities. One of her sisters, Aunt Polya, was a switchwoman. She worked as a switchwoman for 40 years and for 40 years she lived in a cabin near the railway which has remained standing to this day. The First World War was followed by revolution, then by Civil War, and the period of the New Economic Policy. Then came the period of persecution and arrests.

Two years after my parents were married, my father was sent to America to acquire experience. On returning home, he was sent to the Arctic to search for the lost flier. He crashed on the way back in May 1938. Though it is a sin to say this, he died in good time. The secret police were already waiting for him. But since he died, he was buried with honours. By the autumn of 1938, my grandfather had died, and my 28-year-old mother remained with me and my grandmother. Like our neighbour Klara Moiseyevna, we received a flat for the services of our father.

> In our country everything is late somehow

A war broke out in 1941. Rationing was introduced. It was cold in our flat, and we suffered from hunger. In 1943, my stepfather began to live with us. He left his first wife and moved into our flat. My mother felt sympathy for his first wife and even gave her some food. She lived with her second husband for 30 years. He was a real man, with dignity and a good conscience. Thanks to him I grew up a real man, too. And so we lived, trying to survive, till October 8, 1947, when, as I wrote above, my mother went to borrow some potatoes from our neighbours.

Klara Moiseyevna complained to various bodies, even to Beria, but to no avail. Dolya and Vera were sentenced to 25 years in prison, but for some reason other people said they had been convicted to 15 years, may be to show they were not so guilty? They were released in 1954, but the old woman had died. Shortly after that Vera went away with her husband and son. Ida, who lived with Klara Moiseyevna, continued to smoke a lot and soon died, too.

Many years later, in 1980, I received a phone call from Boris Mishne. I invited him to my flat. He had grown old, of course, but remained as thin and energetic as he had been in the past. In the winter of 1952 Boris was thrown into prison and beaten so ruthlessly that he tried to commit suicide twice. The wardens arrived in time, and he was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. "I used to work for the press, you know," he said, "and back in the camp, I soon became indispensable. I wrote to the camp paper even to the central paper of the whole Gulag. I was not taken out to general work, instead I visited brigades and wrote about how they worked. You know, the usual stuff about the plan, the shock workers... When they released me – I was one of the first to be released – the camp bosses remembered my name and spoke highly of me..."

We drank tea and reminisced.

In the past few years I have regularly taken my mother to our country house not far from Moscow, and every time I have asked her to tell me the story about the plain-clothes men. New details surface every time she recollects those events.

"After Stalin's death," mother once said, "I met on a trolleybus the plain-clothes man who visited us several times. I greeted him, but he jumped out of the trolleybus."

"What's his name," I asked.

"His name is Nikolai Ivanovich, a young and even attractive man."

"And what's his surname?"

"I will not give you his name, because you will write somewhere about this or blab it out, and we shall have troubles again. No, I will not tell you his name."

FROM THE XXth CENTURY POLITICAL THOUGHT

Introduced by *New Times* analyst **Rostislav Zolotaryov**

This is the third publication in the series drawing on the Polish social and political thought of the 1960s.

That decade was the Renaissance of previous sociological and philosophical traditions. It has already been said that this tradition was in no way broken during the years of Communist dictatorship. But, first, it was mainly pushed to the periphery, where it remained scientifically relevant, and indulged in marginal social problems. Second, though Stalinist ideology was not able to suppress this tradition, the mainstream of non-Marxist thought was, one must admit, overshadowed by Marxist orthodoxy. The remnants of the socialist tradition, transformed by "fellow travellers" into an ideological ally of Communism, were not able to provide any alternative to the dominant official pseudo-scientific phraseology. Moreover, there was a distinct polarization between the prevalent leftist invocations and the opposing trends of thought. The countervailing trends differed greatly by nature, and the dominance of the first disturbed the balance of the latter. So the dissident thought in the 1950s took a predominantly radical and highly ideological (and not rational and scientific) form.

As the situation changed in the 1960s and the thaw in the Communist movement gave way to new ideas and new generations of scholars, there appeared opportunities for the renewal of Marxist thought. In some way it was a "rebellion of reality," which could not be shoved into dogmatic schemes. And there were new challenges coming from the society which had to cope with very complicated issues. There was a quest to develop the real social science and not a social gospel or a sacred creed to believe in. It changed the attitude of Marxist social thought towards the "bourgeois" sociological tradition. Marxist scholars tried to take "useful parts" of the Western legacy in the social sciences. There were some positive developments even in the Soviet Union in the Khrushchev era. But it was very difficult to restore the theoretical structures in an environment where the original scientific tradition had been demolished long ago. But the impulse was clear and momentous.

Making a breakthrough was less difficult in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, where the ground was more fertile and the memory of real scientific ways had not been wiped away. So many scholars abandoned old orthodoxy and gave themselves to the search for a new theory capable of explaining new realities. Waking up from years of dormancy, they attempted to bridge the ideological gap between the Left and the Right. Some of these attempts were very useful and worthy. One of them we reproduce here from the *Polish Sociological Bulletin* (1/1968).

A tale of two thinkers: Weber and Marx

Stanislaw Kozyr-Kowalski

Max Weber's sociology was born in "a long and intense dialogue with the shadow of Karl Marx." This formulation may be a very useful point of reference in an analysis of Max Weber's sociology of religion. In April 1918, Max Weber delivered in Vienna a series of lectures concerned with "a positive critique of historical materialism." The lectures were based on his investigations into the sociology of religion and the sociology of the state. The author of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* defined in these lectures his sociology of religion as a positive critique of historical materialism. His critique of historical materialism was "positive" in at least two senses:

Weber does not confine himself to formulating more or less pertinent objections to Marx's theory, but he first of all tries to verify the usefulness of that theory in the light of thorough positive empirical research. All Weber's studies in the sociology of religion were integrated by his endeavour to oppose to Marx's theory his own positive theory that would explain the influence of religion upon social life and historical processes and would define the role of religion in the birth of West European capitalism. Weber's works were not only a critique, but also an assimilation of many elements of historical materialism. This also applies to his sociology of religion.

The concept of "positive critique of historical materialism" acquires still another sense if we consider a small paper by Weber, *Die sozialen Gründe des Untergangs der antiken Kultur*, first published in the periodical "Die Wahrheit" in 1896. In his analysis of the causes of the fall of the Roman Empire Weber refuted in turn all the explanatory hypotheses current in contemporary historiography. He claimed that Rome collapsed neither because of an invasion and the numerical superiority of the barbarians over the imperial troops, nor because of the lack of political talent and the mistakes committed by the leaders. The decline of the great empire was not due to its political system and despotism, and even less so to the way of life of the upper classes, demoralized by luxury and laxity of manners. The emancipation of Roman women and the decomposition of the traditional family also did not contribute much to the decline and the fall of the Roman Empire: the victory of the Germanic invaders depended as little on the social position of the Roman women as did the outcome of the battle of Königgratz depend on the Prussian teachers. Weber also disagreed with the assertions, which originated even in antiquity, that Italy fell victim of the latifunds, because, he claimed, the decline of ancient culture coincided with a rise of the status of the peasants. Weber thought that the secret of the collapse of the Roman Empire was to be sought in the economic system of that empire. Beginning with the reforms initiated by the Gracchi, that system was characterized by a market economy dependent upon slave-manned agriculture. From that time on the slave-owners, who lived in towns, were active in political life, and lived on the money obtained from their real estates run for them by non-free overseers, became the economic bearers of ancient culture", and "the organization of slave work formed the necessary basis (Unterbau) of Roman society."

In a system of slave work and latifunds marketable production, Weber says, cannot in the long run do without a whip: the producers must be subject to a discipline of a military type. Discipline of such a type could be ensured only by training the slaves to a bar-

rack-like way of life, that is, by depriving them not only of property, but of family as well. Barrack-like way of life made it impossible to satisfy the demand for manpower by a natural increase of the slave population; in this way the fuctioning of the economic system depended on a regular inflow of slaves into the Roman slave market. That dependence of Rome's economic system on a regular supply of slaves to the Italian markets was not only an important factor in the expansionist tendencies of the empire, but also became an essential cause of its decline and fall. As soon as Rome proved unable to wage victorious wars of annexation, her economic structure had to undergo considerable changes. The role of the slaves in production began to lose importance, and the slaves themselves gradually came to be replaced by pesants who had property and families, but had their freedom restricted by the various forms of serfdom. This led to a new division into (social) estates, which replaced the former simple opposition between the free and the non-free. The disappearance of the institution which Weber termed "slave barracks" and the emergence of the various forms of serf labour resulted in the decline of the market economy, in the decline of Roman towns, and in the increased importance of self-sufficient natural economy. The fall of the Roman Empire had its main cause in the decomposition of market economy, based on slave labour, and the emergence of natural economy with the accompanying forms of serfdom and serf labour.

"The fall of Rome was a necessary political consequence of a gradual disappearance of market economy and the growth of natural economy. It meant in fact the abolition of that system of administration, with the accompanying political superstructure (Überbau) based on money economy, that was non longer adjusted to its economic base (Unterbau) consisting of natural economy."

I leave it to the historians to appraise the empirical value of Weber's theory of the cause of the fall of the Roman Empire. I am interested in it now solely because of its theoretical structure. His theory shows that up to 1896 Max Weber was under the overwhelming influence of historical materialism, and even explicitly accepted the thesis that changes in the economic base are of decisive importance for all forms of culture. But he interpreted that thesis much as it was then interpreted by the leading theoreticians of the German social democracy. Most objections later raised by Weber concerning Marx's theory also apply to his, Weber's, theory of the collapse of Roman civilization.

The paper on *Die Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* marks a turning point in Max Weber's intellectual evolution, and stands at the beginning of the long period of his critique of Marx's theory. A comparison of that paper with the study concerned with the fall of the Roman Empire brings out a new meaning of the term "positive critique of historical materialism:" Weber treats his positive critique of historical materialism as a specific self-criticism, a form of reckoning with his former attitude as a scholar.

Weber published *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* in 1904-05, in two consecutive volumes of the "Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik." The paper soon acquitted international renown and beacame a subject matter of lively controversies. As it suggested a tentative appraisal of the role of Protestantism in the rise of capitalism it drew the attention of historians, economists, and sociologists. During the last sixty years it became one of the most widely known and at the same time one of the most controversial papers by Max Weber. Marianne Weber said that *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* was an endeavour to overcome the materialistic interpretation of history. It was also universally treated as such.

Many scholars saw in Weber's paper on the relationships between Protestantism and the "spirit" of capitalism a critique of Marx from the positions of traditional idealism. In their opinion the essence of Weber's paper is as follows. The rise of capitalism was determined by religious factors, and not by the inner dialectics of economic processes. The capitalist economic system owes its existence to the "spirit of capitalism," that is, a complex of definite attitudes to social reality in general, and to economic activity in particular. Should the spirit of capitalism have hot appeared and have not dominated the mentality of the masses, history would never know the phenomenon called capitalism. But the genealogy of the spirit of capitalism is to be sought in the religious, and not in the economic, sphere. It was produced and spread by the ascetic forms of Protestantism: Calvinism, Pietism, Methodism, and Baptist sects. Thus the capitalist economic system was born directly of the "spirit of capitalism," and indirectly from Protestantism, especially from Calvinism.

A long list could be made of the names of those scholars who think that Weber, in opposition to historical materialism, tried to defend the thesis stating that the capitalist mode of production was a product of Protestant religion.

Such an interpretation of Weber's study, common as it is, is nevertheless untenable. It is refuted by both the text of *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* and the analysis of Weber's attitude toward historical materialism, based on the fundamental part of his works.

Max Weber not only does oppose to primitivity of Marxian orthodoxy, but provides us with tools for investigating the role of all cultural factors and their influence on social developments

Weber never formulated the thesis that Protestant religion brought the capitalist mode of production to life. Such an opinion is due entirely to his interpreters and critics, and is one of the many misunderstandings and simplifications that can for years survive on the pages of books dedicated to the humanities.

The misunderstandings over *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* cannot be sufficiently explained by the fact that in many cases the knowledge of his study was not due to his critics' own reading, but was received from other people's reviews; nor can it be explained away by certain hesitations and theoretical inconsistencies, noticable in Weber's study. Those misunderstandings have a deeper foundation: Weber's study of Protestant ethics and the spirit of capitalism is usually analyzed without consideration of its connection with Weber's other works, and even with his other studies in the sociology of religion.

Max Weber, as his wife recalls, had profound respect for the works of Karl Marx. Ernst Troeltsch, a close friend of the author of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* mentioned the influence Marx's theory had on Weber's research. Troeltsch thought that Max Weber in his studies in the philosophy and history of culture had mainly taken up the Marxist problems. In the early period Weber saw in them one of the fundamental principles of interpreting culture and history. Later he reduced the significance of the Marxist method to the problem of the relations between the dominant socio-economic factors and the main elements of culture. Weber highly appreciated the contribution of Marxism to the advancement of the science of society. Though the author of *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft* believed himself to be an opponent of Marx, he could not stand any primitive and superficial criticism of historical materialism.

In February 1920, that is just a few months before his death, Weber and Spengler took part in a meeting organized in the town hall by Munich students. Spengler presented there the main theses of his book *Untergang des Abendlandes*, and then turned to a criticism of Nietzsche and Marx. His unfavourable references to Nietzsche, recalls E. Baumgarten, a disciple of Weber, made Weber frown, but it was only the ridiculing of Marxian forecasts that solicited a sharp reply from Max Weber...

Those who have interpreted *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* as a tentative thesis, to be opposed to Marx's theory, that capitalism was a product of Protestantism, and that religious phenomena were the main source of the capitalist economy, fail to notice how difficult it would be to bring that into line with Weber's article published in 1907, that is, two years after the appearance of his study on Protestant ethics, and concerned with a critique of Stammler's "overcoming" of historical materialism. Weber thought that Stammler's "historical spiritualism," claiming that all

social phenomena are in the last analysis determined by religious motives, was a groundless hypothesis, contradicted by all those facts that could be empirically established. But Weber's main criticism focussed on Stammler's inclination to monocausal interpretations, that is, causal interpretations of all phenomena by reference to a single principle. In the same article Weber emphasized the heuristic value of Marxian materialism. If historical materialism is treated as a method that serves to interpret data from the "economic" point of view, and if it is applied prudently and with a constant confrontation with facts, then the method can yield fertile results.

In one of his articles Weber pays much attention to the theory of historical materialism and states his opinion on the significance of the studies of economic phenomena for a scientific interpretation of historical facts. He thinks that economic phenomena in the strict sense of the term ought to be distinguished from those which are economically relevant and those which are economically conditioned.

Economic phenomena in the strict sense are those in which we are interested because of their economic significance (stock exchanges, banks). They are, as a rule, institutions intentionally created or used for economic purposes. Phenomena which are economically relevant are not singled out because of their economic significance, but in some situations acquire such significance, because their consequences are important from the economic point of view. In other words, they are those non-economic phenomena which affect economic processes. Religion is quoted by Max Weber as an example of a phenomenon that is economically relevant. Finally, phenomena which are economically conditioned are all those non-economic phenomena which do not affect, or do so on a small scale, the economic life, but are more or less influenced by economic phenomena. Using Weber's terminology one could say that those phenomena which are economically conditioned are the object of interest of the theory of historical materialism.

Marxists cannot remain in ignorance and dissmiss social theories developed in the XXth century to overcome the fallacies of great political ideas of the past

Weber emphasizies the importance of the study of those phenomena which are economically conditioned. He thinks that the force of specifically economic motives "has everywhere (...) conditioned and transformed not only the mode in which cultural wants or preferences are satisfied, but their content as well, even in their most subjective aspects. The indirect influence of social relations, institutions and groups governed by 'material interests' extends (often unconsciously) into all spheres of culture without exception, even into the finest nuances of aesthetic and religious feeling."

The formulations are hardly to be reconciled with the opinion that in *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* Max Weber opposes historical materialism by justifying the thesis that capitalism was a product of Protestantism. This is even harder to believe in view of the fact that Weber all the time emphasizes the fertility of the Marxian method reasonably applied: "Liberated as we are from the antiquated notion that all cultural phenomena can be deduced as a product of function of the constellation of 'material' interests, we believe nevertheless that the analysis of social and cultural phenomena with special reference to their economic conditioning and ramifications was a scientific principle of creative fruitfulness and with careful application and freedom from dogmatic restrictions will remain such for a very time to come."

Weber thinks that the period of overestimation of the economic interpretation of history there followed the danger of its being underestimated. Any correct interpretation of *Die protestantische Etnik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* may not be in contradiction with the opinion of the author of that paper, who stated explicitly that he had never subscribed to the "unreasonable and doctrinaire thesis" that the "spirit of capitalism" (...) *could* have been born *only* as a result of definite influences of the Reformation, because "certain important forms of capitalism is a product of the Reformation."

Anticipating objections by some not too careful readers of his study Max Weber says that capitalism may not be considered a product of the Reformation, because "certain important forms of the capitalist enterprise are much older than the Reformation."

Neither does Weber claim that the spirit of capitalism is a product of the Reformation alone. The ascetic variations of Protestantism are an important, but only one of the many factors that contributed to the birth of the spirit of capitalism. In *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* his objective is only to find out "whether, and to what an extent, religious influence participated in the qualitative shaping and the quantitative expansion of the 'spirit' in the world, and which concrete aspects of the culture based on capitalism can be reduced to them."

Weber does not question the importance of economic changes for the rise of capitalism, nor does he exclude their influence upon the shaping of the spirit of capitalism. In analyzing the role of ascetic Protestantism in the origin of the capitalist civilization he also refers to the need of investigating "the influence of the totality of historical, and especially *economic,* cultural conditions on the transformations and characteristics of Protestant asceticism."

The principal thesis of *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* can be defined as follows: Protestantism is one of the many causes of the birth of the spirit of capitalism, and certainly one of the many causes of the rise of capitalism. The essential content of Weber's study is interpreted in a similar way by the eminent French sociologist Raymond Aron... The American sociologist Talcott Parsons goes much farther in his interpretation when he thinks that Weber has demonstrated in his studies in the sociology of religion that Protestantism was one of the principal conditions of the birth of capitalism. Protestantism alone, without the cooperation of other factors, was not in a position to give rise to the capitalist organization of labour, but without Protestant ethics all those factors would not have called capitalism into being. Protestantism was a necessary, though not a sufficient, condition of the birth of capitalism. Parsons thinks that in his studies on the religions of China and India Weber has proved that there was such a period in the history of those countries in which non-religious factors favoured capitalism at least as much as they did in the West. Yet capitalism was not born there because a religion was missing that would affect the ethics of economic activity in a way similar to Protestantism.

Talcott Parsons obtained his doctor's degree of the University of Heidelberg for a thesis concerned with the concept of capitalism in the theories of Max Weber and Werner Sombart. This may be why the author of *The Structure of Social Action* read Weber's works as it were through the prism of Sombart's theory of the rise of capitalism, and Sombart thought that the diaspora of the Jews was one of the many necessary conditions for the rise of capitalism. But Parsons' interpretation is untenable.

Nothing can be found in any of Weber's works dedicated to Eastern religions that could authorize us to ascribe to Weber the opinion that in some period in the history of China or India extra-religious factors favoured the rise of capitalism to the same extent as they did in the Western world. On the contrary, it can easily be proved be referring to Weber's texts that in all periods of history differences between the East and the West occurred, in Weber's opinion, not only in the religious sphere: economic organization, social structure, power structure, the position of towns, legal system and the level of science in the East were a barrier to the rise of modern bourgeois capitalism there.

It is true that in *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* Max Weber tried to demonstrate that Protestantism influenced the formation of certain aspects of capitalist civilization, but the main objective of his paper was to show how religious ideas affect the course of history. On the last pages of his study he says that research done so far does not still make it possible to establish what was the position of puritanism in the set of the various factors that contributed to the rise of capitalism. To answer the question what role was played by puritan asceticism in the origin of capitalist civilization it is necessary, according to Weber, to study the importance of "inner-wordly asceticism" for practical social and political ethics and for the functioning of the various organizations and social groups. It is also necessary to establish what was the relationship between ascetic Protestantism on the one hand and the content, ideals, and influence of Renaissance rationalism, the rise of philosophical and scientific empiricism, and the development of technology and

the spiritual assets of culture. It is also necessary to study the Medieval sources of "inner-worldly asceticism" and the formation of that concept. Weber emphalsizes that the role of Protestantism in the rise of capitalism cannot be established without an investigation into the influence upon puritan asceticism of the totality of social and historical conditions, and economic conditions in particular...

In his paper *Antikritisches Schlusswort* (1910) Weber tried to dispel the misunderstandings around his studies of Protestant ethics, and for that purpose he stated explicitly that such specific properties of medieval European civilization as the development of technology, climatic and geographical conditions, political and social organization, the status of towns that favoured the birth of modern bourgeoisie, and the structure of craftsmen's and industrial enterprises, might be accepted as the principal historical conditions of the rise of capitalism. A more detailed analysis of extra-religious factors in the origin of West European capitalism was made by him in the paper *Agrarverhältnisse im Altertum* (1909), where he pointed to the great importance of the history of medieval towns, the structure of state and the estate structure of society for the economic evolution of Europe. Nor did he forget the role of economic conditions: "Modern capitalism based the conditions of its development on the medieval organization of trade and crafts, despite all the campaigns against the guilds, partly beside that organization and partly within it, but always by making use of the practical and legal forms it had created."

Max Weber insight into the nature of social phenomena, into the understanding of cultural context of economic and political life leads us away from social myths and illusions

If the numerous misunderstandings accumulated around *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus* are disregarded, are there any reasons to treat Weber's sociology of religion as a positive critique of historical materialism? To answer this question we have first to establish what Weber meant by historical materialism and how he interpreted Marx's theory.

Historical materialism was for him a theory that propounds unilateral economic determinism and refuses all autonomy to all forms of social consciousness. By rejecting the independence of ideological phenomena it excludes the possibility of their affecting the course of history...

Weber blames the Marxists for taking economic relations and interests as the only real aspect of history and for calling everything else "ideological superstructure" or "ideological reflection."

In Weber's opinion, historical materialism interprets the opposition between political and religious thought merely as a function of the conflict of material interests, whereas in fact that opposition is conditioned by the evolutional trends in those fields of thought as well. While he does not deny considerable heuristic values of historical materialism, Weber firmly objects to turning Marx's theory into a universal form of a causal interpretation of history. He thinks that the followers of historical materialism try to reduce all historical events to economic factors, and when it turns out that certain phenomena cannot be explained by reference to economic motives, then they are termed accidental phenomena and thus denied historical importance.

A thorough analysis of Marx's theory easily reveals that Weber's description of historical materialism is too general to decide what was the relationship between Weber's idea of historical materialism and the real meaning of Marx's theory.

In the light of the above it would not be possible to clear Weber of the blame that he interpreted the Marxist theory of historical processes in a simplified manner. Such simplified interpretations can also be found in *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*. In trying to demonstrate that the spirit of capitalism may not be conceived of merely as a reflection of material interests Weber points to the fact that in the 14th and 15th centuries Florence, which was then the money market of all European great powers, the attitudes defined as "the spirit of capitalism" were stigmatized as dishonest and immoral, whereas the same attitudes were winning moral approval in backward Pennsylvania in the 18th century, where trade could not thrive for lack of money, large capitalist enterprise did not exist, and banks were just only coming to existence. In another place of the same work he says that in Massachusetts, Franklin's home state, the spirit of capitalism preceded capitalist evolution. In southern American colonies, founded by great capitalists guided by economic motives, capitalism developed much less than it did in New England, where the colonies were founded for religious motives by preachers assisted by craftsmen and farmers.

These critical remarks made by Weber show clearly that he did not fully comprehend Marx's words about the historical and social nature of economic phenomena, and that in his criticism of Marxian materialism he showed inclination to replacing the concept of social and historical mode of production by a rather ahistorical concept of "economic interests." The concept of "economic interests" acquires often the trivial sense of being synonymous with craving for material goods and money. Weber's examples would undermine the theory of historical materialism only if the supporters of that theory claimed not only that Protestantism could not emerge and win in many countries without definite economic and social conditions, but also that it could not be adjusted to other economic and social conditions. Should historical materialism assert such a mechanical and univocal dependence of ideology on socio-economic structure, then the historical continuity of many forms of culture would mean its complete refutation. To Weber's objections one might reply with the formulation included in Engels' well-known letter to Konrad Schmidt (dated October 27, 1890): "Hence if Barth thinks that we deny all secondary influence of political and other reflections of economic life on that life itself, he is simply fighting windmills. It suffices to have a look at Marx's *The 18th Brumaire...*, where reference is made almost exclusively to the special role played by political conflicts and events, of course within the framework of their general dependence on economic conditions. Or to look up in *Capital*, for instance the section of the working hours, which points to the importance of legislation, which is nothing else than a political act." But if Marxism is interpreted, in accordance with the requirements of historicism, as an element of the process of social evolution and history, then Weber's studies of religion may be treated as a criticism of certain weak points of non-dialectical Marxism as interpreted by German social democrats.

One of the basic points in my further considerations will be a tentative answer to the question, what is the manifestation and the empirical sense of Weber's specific method of interpreting the role of religion in social processes? The other questions would be, what is the relationship between that method, on the one hand, and the theory of historical materialism and Weber's "understanding sociology," on the other? And what are the limits of the use of that method in research? It is not possible to answer those questions without a fairly detailed description of the content of Weber's works on Protestantism and capitalism. Such a description is also needed in the case of my criticism of interpretational misunderstandings which for sixty years have been besetting *Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus*, thus affecting the reception of Weber's works in the contemporary humanities, and hence, indirectly, also the reception of Marx's theory. ■

This woman had many names. The first name, Renée Marceau, was given to her by her father, a French worker Rober Marceau, on August 10, 1913, the day she was born. And her last name – **Elly Bronina** – she got from her husband, brigade cammander Yakov Bronin, known among intelligence officers, the man who replaced the legendary Richard Sorge in Shanghai in 1934. This name is written in the documents on her decoration with the Red Star order in 1935 and the Order of Lenin in 1937. She merited the awards for carrying out special tasks of the Soviet intelligence.

When Yakov Bronin was in Shanghai Elly worked as a radio operator for him. The following episode occured in 1934. For some time the Soviet intelligence had received no radiograms from Richard Sorge. People in Moscow got worried and decided to send an expert on wireless to Sorge. They chose Elly. Having checked Sorge's wireless Elly saw that it was functioning normally, but it turned out the radio operator was afraid to work "abroad."

In 1936 she was sent alone to Spain. With false documents, under an assumed name – one of the many she had – she crossed the whole of Europe and penetrated General Franco's headquarters.

In 1942 Elly joined the CPSU. And seven years later she was labelled "the wife of an enemy of the nation," who, fortunatelly, was exonerated in 1955. From the first days of the war she took a deep interest in medicine. In 1949 she defended her thesis for a candidate's degree at the First Moscow Medical Institute. The subject of her paper was "Early diagnosis of stenocardia by means of electrocardiographic exertion tests." Her knowledge of foreign languages and ability to work with the radio helped her a lot. She was getting ready for a higher Doctor's degree. But in the early 1950s she was kicked out from the clinic. She had to lead a hand to mouth existence of a rank-and-file doctor of an outpatient clinic and finally had to give up the work she loved so much and to earn her living with translations to have some money to feed her children.

In the mid-1960s Elly Bronina received a special pension from the Soviet government. In 1978 she left the CPSU, which was a very brave step at that time. But Elly says, she realized that "the party was spreading injustice in the country."

Renée-Elly met many people in her life: Richard Sorge, Tukhachevsky and Meretskov, the heroes of the future "Red Capella." She is now describing them in her memoirs. This is what she writes: "Like many other people I sincerely believed at that time that following the 1917 October revolution the Soviet Union has turned into a country of justice and for 60 years I worked side by side with its people who were longing for justice as much as I was. Together with the people I learned such political lessons which are most probably unknown to any other nation of the world. I belong to this nation now."

Elly is writing her memoirs in her apartment in Altufievskoye avenue. They are in French and in Russian. At odd moments she translates works on manual therapy. Her translations will be published. But who will publish the memoirs?

* * *

Fifty-two-year-old German **Konrad Kujau** has made falsification his trade. However, he is not afraid of prosecution and earns his living with his *Galerie der Fälschungen* in Stuttgart.

Kujau became famous in Germany eight years ago when he published in the Hamburg weekly *Stern* Hitler's diary written... by Kujau. Later he told that money did not concern him at all at that time. He was simply curious to check the "professionalism of our dear, esteemed professors." This experiment cost him three years of imprisonment. But he came out of prison as a recognized expert in the field of forgeries and falsifications. For instance, in 1988 he easily determined that the telegram, published in another Hamburg weekly *Der Spiegel* and containing the order about the deportation of thousands of civilians

Human rigths protection activists join the centre

Alexei Smirnov, a 40-year-old member of the Moscow Helsinki group, has become the executive director of a new organization – the Centre on Human Rights. The Centre will attempt to pool the efforts of many human rights protection organizations of the country, to make their work more effective. So far it includes the Moscow group of assistance to the implementation of the Helsinki Accords, the Committee of Soldiers' Mothers, the human rights protection group of the Moscow Memorial society, the Committee on Social Defence, and the Civil Aid committee on assistance to refugees and forced émigrés. All these organizations are supposed to remain independent and work independently, though in the same building and coordinating their effort. Only then will joint work be possible, if there's need in it at all.

Smirnov says that the Centre would like to concentrate on two problems. The first is to establish public control over politics and influence political structures to make them respect human rights. The other problem is to make not only politicians but the entire society immune to dictatorship, arbitrary rule, lawlessness and human rights violations. These tasks are so enormous that they can be fulfilled only through concerted action of many human rights protection activists and only on condition that they will keep together.

"I believe that everybody knows what forces and organizations violated human rights in this country – from mass terror to the deception of public opinion both in and outside the country." Smirnov believes that deception is still a common phenomenon. As an example he mentions the newspaper of the Central Committee of the CPSU *Glasnost,* the plagiarism of the name of the magazine *Glasnost* issued by the human rights protection activist Sergei Grigoryants. To prevent this, human rights protection organizations must be strong enough and act together if need be.

Alexei is the grandson of writer Alexei Kosterin, a well-known dissident of the 1960s. In 1979-82 Alexei Smirnov and Ivan Kovalev published an information bulletin on human rights whose materials were often used by Kronid Lyubarsky in "The Current Events Chronicle" and "News from the USSR".

In 1982 Smirnov was arrested and sentenced to 10 years of labour camps according to Article 70 – for anti-Soviet activity. He served his term in the legendary Perm camp for political prisoners and in the prison in Chistopol. He has not been exonerated.

If you want and can support the foundation of the Centre you can send the money to Bank Account 700283 at the Shabolovsky branch of Moscow's Zhilsotsbank. You must note that it is a charity donation into the authorized fund of the scientific, information and educational centre Memorial for the programme *The Organization of the Moscow Branch of the International Research Centre on Human Rights.* Address the money to A. Smirnov.

during the war, signed by an officer of Wehrmacht Kurt Waldheim, who later was Austria's Chancellor and the UN Secretary General, was a falsification.

Kujau claims that he can forge the hand of almost any political figure: Wilhelm II, Hindenburg, Bismarck, Napoleon and even the present German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But he takes a special delight in painting. In his *Galerie der Fälschungen* he displayed his 62 imitations of famous artists. Kujau makes fun of those who spend months trying to make a 100 percent exact copy of the original. His approach is purely creative. He can paint a picture in the style of von Gogh or change the direction of Franz Marc's galloping rider.

* * *

Russian drama theatre of the past decade has been the theatre of the director's diktat. **Yuri Nepomnyashchy,** a graduate of the State Institute of Dramatic Art, a theatre director by education and profession, has set up an anti-director and purely actors' theatre *Vernisazh*.

Staying in the background he lets the actors show their worth. His task is to form an actors' ensemble of equal talents and preserve the author's intonations in stage productions. Many people must be remembering Victoria Lepko – barmaid Karolinka from the once popular TV show *The 13 Chairs*. Yuri Nepomnyashchy saw that she could play tragic parts, and she is successfully leading the theatre's complex repertoire. The director has completely changed her artistic career.

The theatre's repertoires has no political plays. It includes Ingmar Bergman's cinematographic story "I am my husband's mistress" interpreted for the theatre by Nepomnyashchy;

plays by Jean-Paul Sartre *Hell (Behind a closed door)* and by American authors G. Cromwell and V. Steinbeck *Broadway* (two stories from the life of artists).

Nepomnyashchy's *Vernisazh* is one of the few young theatre companies which survived and developed in the past few years. Now they have their audience and their own address in Moscow – 5, Begovaya St.

L. Stolbova

* * *

Books about the Soviet Union during perestroika by Italian journalist **Giulietto Chiesa** have become manuals in many American universities. Hardly is there any other foreign correspondent in Moscow who has written so much about the reforms in this country in the past few years.

At first Chiesa issued a book together with Roy Medvedev enfitled *The Soviet Union – Time of Change* where they gave an exact forecast of the development of democracy in this country. It was yet in the 1980s. This book was followed by another, called *La Revoluzione di Gorbacev* – an account of events from the beginning of restructuring and up to 1989. That year he was invited to George Kennan's Research Center in the US and there wrote his third book *Transition to the Democracy*. In the 1960s, during a students' mutiny Chiesa was member of the Secretariat of the Young Communist League and became vice-president of the Union of Italian Students. He joined the Communist party. Worked for *L'Unita* in Rome, then in Belgrade and then was sent to Moscow. But the Italian Communist party was not popular with the Soviet authorities and Chiesa was officialy accredited only in 1980, ten years after he was appointed correspondent. His very first reports from Moscow were so amazingly critical that at home he was considered an anti-Communist.



On his return from the US in 1989 he went to Moscow again – this time as a correspondent of *La Stampa*. He still hopes that at least one of his books will be translated into Russian. Perhaps his books will be of interest to Soviet students, too.

An. Grachev

A champion of the state sector

Forty-five-year-old **Igor Artyukh,** the director of the scientific and research association *Toriy* and head of the Union of Moscow Enterprises has signed an agreement with Yuri Luzhkov, head of Moscow government. Under the agreement members of the Union shall increase in the coming two years the output of consumer goods even above the set tasks, despite the total slump in industrial output in the country.

"Government enterprises have united," explains Artyukh, "in order to work out a common policy line. This is necessary, since the regulations issued of late gave preference largely to new forms of entreprise – cooperatives and leasing services. Experts began leaving the state sector. However, contrary to all expectations labour productivity in cooperatives and leasing services has not exceeded that at state enterprises. This accounts for the current situation on the consumer market."

Artyukh welcomes all forms of property, but he is against giving preference to any one of them. We've already passed that stage when the state sector monopolized the economy, he says, and we can see what it has led to. Why fall into another extreme? His Union will defend this position. However, at present it is open not only to state factories but to representatives of other forms of property as well.

Moreover, since the Union plans to engage in commerce. The Moscow city council transfers to it some ten or twelve stores which will sell goods manufactured by the Union members.

So far the Union groups 105 entreprises with a total of 700 thousand workers.

Igor Artyukh has been working with his association ever since he graduated the Ryazan Radio Engineering Institute. In 1990 he won the state award, and is the Honored Inventor of the Russian Federation. Apart from his work as head of the *Toriy* association, he is head of a chair at the Moscow Institute of Radio Engineering, Electronics and Automation and is a member of the Consultative Board of Directors under the Prime Minister of the USSR.

I. Zharkikh

The lost generation or the lucky one?

Is there really a spiritual crisis?

Alexander Mulyarchik,
D. Sc. (Philology)

Two topics have been the focus of the Soviet press' attention: the social crisis and the crisis in literature. These are two different things; of course, as far their tension and manifestations are concerned. By the middle of this year a very definite position had been formed in the assessment of the social and literary situation.

After several years of hopes and bold constructive initiatives dull and nearly apocalyptic tones have prevailed everywhere. This can easily be explained by taking into account such realities as the Soviet cinema which is practically "invisible," Moscow theatres which only go on tours abroad, and the great mass of specialists – both young and old – eager for an exodus to the West, although it may be too early for them to be so confident in their ability to compete in the international market.

But these psychological syndromes and other similar ones have happened throughout the 20th century. Let us remember Oswald Spengler and the "twilight of the West" that he heralded soon after the Second World War. The lost generation that was nurtured by those ideas – Erich Maria Remarque, Richard Aldington, Eveleen Waugh, Ernest Hemingway, John Dos Passos, Thornton Niven Wilder – is now rightfully regarded as the cream of modern literature and its chronicler, the American critic Malcolm Cowley, called his contemporaries "the lucky generation."

One more example from abroad.

The 1980s was the most socially and economically favourable decade in the West in the 20th century. However, real culture did not flourish and world literature was not enriched by any new masterpieces. This, however, did not cause any special concern in connection with the impending change of cultural priorities which we do not really understand. The essence of that change of priorities is that culture, especially culture in the United States, has irrevocably started to move deeper into the popular masses. It was not the culture which is being foisted on Soviet people by Mr. Tagi-zade and the heads of the Soviet television (I mean the TV serial *Dallas* which had peacefully died in the United States by the time it was aired on Soviet TV), but really good, time-tested works of culture which make up a mighty wave of enlightenment.

In other words, every culture has its ups and downs. As for the Soviet spiritual crisis, it seems so profound largely because of the fact that inside society as a whole, and the artistic intelligentsia in particular, there are few people who are prepared for a fast turn towards a relatively free economy and more democratic political and social activities.

The experience of the world and, in particular, the experience of the West, which has made great headway in many directions since the end of the 1960s, has remained out of reach for the better part of the Soviet intelligentsia. This has happened in spite of the fact that in the past 25 years the Russian literati in the West – critics, publishers, translators – have done a lot to inform their possible listeners about how real human relations are formed, and how concrete problems are solved in what is now often referred to as "civilized cohabitation."

Now as the switchover to the free market economy is taking place, authors and critics living abroad are in a much harder situation than their colleagues at home. Their manuscripts are the first to be omitted from the editors' plans, the literary journals have little space for them, while the future of the specialized journal *Inostrannaya Literatura*, which has lost many subscribers, looks doubtful. The blame is on the population, preoccupied with everyday problems, pains, and troubles, and on the financiers who have withdrawn the hard-currency back-up of translations of foreign literature published after May 1973.

For these reasons the isolation from the living pictures of foreign life and from the analytical interpretation of such pictures may only grow worse. The contrast between the real situation and the animated talk about interdependence and the need for a common economic and intellectual space will soon become striking. Those who are going to appear now in the renewed echelons of state power will have to understand that, in relations with foreign countries profound cultural knowledge cannot be replaced by either computer statistics or the scraps of visual impressions.

It is essential that we know what provides the "fodder" for the millions of intellectuals around the world who are closely connected with each other through the



advanced means of communication and information. The broadening of vistas is also necessary to enable us not to pay any serious attention to literary trivialities. Those who are familiar with the works of Vladimir Nabokov and who know the American post-beat generation headed by Hubert Selby and the black humour writers for what they really are, will never dream of acknowledging the "alternative literature's" right to at least minimal independent significance.

Many regard it as a positive sign that the process of "filling in the niches," meaning the publication of works by forgotten émigré writers, continues. In my opinion, this process, which has already crushed the tentative upshoots of the "perestroika literature," can be viewed from two angles. On the one hand, we are going back 50 to 70 years and are coming to know what educated foreigners (those who professionally deal with such problems) have long since learned and been taking into account in their cultural development. On the other hand, it is evident that the miraculous synthesis of the old Russian spiritual tradition, the emigration-generated ideas about the catastrophic 20th century, and the new experience that has descended on us at the turn of the 21st century is only possible on the native soil.

This applies both to non belles-lettres genres (for example Zinaida Hippius' *Petersburg Diaries* are very useful for those who wish to better understand the current developments) and to fiction as well. But one more ingredient is especially important – the checking of the intellectual process, of all its factors and dimensions, on the basis of exact knowledge. We need not fear that, since Russia and its best representatives are able, intellectually and artistically, to stand up to any competition.

Thus, speaking of our prospects in this sphere, I am not going to unconditionally join the prevailing pessemistic attitude. Given a reasonable state policy in the field of culture, we will be able to hold the position which our country has reached thanks to the existence of such a phenomenon as the Russian intelligentsia of the 19th and 20th centuries. In the opinion of a great part of the world, Russia appears as a reserve of spiritual values, where there is a lively interest in poetry, unlike in France, for instance, and where the very title of Poet or Writer enjoys stable public respect, as in Germany of the Novalis and Hölderlin times or in New England in the days of Emerson and his transcedentalist friends.

Inherent in our cultural heritage, lifestyle, national character, and the surviving spiritual and philosophic principles, our moral potential is a great universal value. It may easily be a part of the guarantee without which the pragmatic world will be reluctant to render to us any considerable and stable assistance. Preventing the destruction of this potential in these troubled times, means preserving the hope that the spiritual crisis will eventually be overcome. ■



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The thesis which was never accepted

My friend, an expert on Latin America, wrote a Ph.D. dissertation some 27 years ago which wasn't accepted. The work was devoted to progressive tendencies in the Brazilian army. He did not manage to defend his thesis because of the coup. The theme of the paper was inspired by the statement of the then General Secretary of the Brazilian Communist Party Luis Carlos Prestes (a former combat engineer captain and the leader of the legendary military uprising), who claimed that the army supported him.

But faith in the leader's forecasts was not the only motive which guided my friend. At the time, the early 1960s, the powerful left-wing Lieutenants Movement appeared within the framework of the general upsurge of left-wing forces in Brazil. However, everything was decided by the generals who occupied the country in one night – from March 31 to April 1. That "April revolution" was for a long time described as "salutary".

Every military coup has its own circumstances and its own underlying intrigues. It is not accidental that abortive coups prevail over successful ones, and the number of victims differs. As a result of some of them the country's government seems to remain the same, but the political leaders become puppets in the hands of generals. In this situation we speak of the country's "Bordaberrization", after the president of Uruguay who reigned but had no power in his hands.

According to our former classification, military coups were divided into reactionary and progressive. A coup was "progressive" if the forces which carried it out conflicted with Washington and nationalized private property. However, we were quite loyal to the Brazilian and Argentine military, which were far from progressive, but we pounced on Pinochet, who, frankly speaking, should have shared the criticism addressed against him with his counterparts in other countries. And he achieved much more than any of them in the economic field.

It is hard to understand how a coup originates. But it is clear, for instance, that Latin American officers have an ideological bent for conservatism. And during periods of reform, if views acquired in school and cultivated in the army, barred from the rest of the world, are concerned, it is very easy to provoke a reactionary military coup.

It is especially easy if the reforms concern the officer's material interests. In Argentina coups have been taking place until now even though there seems to be no hope for their success, as Argentine generals who were in power left a very bad heritage: the collapsing economy, a massive foreign debt, the disgraceful defeat of the Malvinas, and torture cellars. Nevertheless, the country's colonels are still trying to solve their problems with the help of arms. And they do have problems to solve.

Disturbances are a necessary precondition of a military coup. Here's the declaration of the Chilean military junta:

Taking into consideration,

1. The extremely serious economic, social, and moral crisis undermining the country.

2. The inability of the government to take steps to stop an escalation of the chaos.

3. The constant mushrooming of paramilitary groups organized and trained by the Popular Unity block, supporting Allende – the fact which will invariably draw the Chilean into a civil war.

Peruvian soldiers with a detainee. Trusting the army to establish law and order means increasing the risk of a coup

Photo from the magazine Oiga (Peru)

The Armed Forces and the Carabineers' Corps state:

1. The President of the Republic should immediately resign his high commission to the Chilean Armed Forces and the Carabineers' Corps.

2. The Chilean Armed Forces and the Carabineers' Corps have unanimously decided to assume the responsible historic mission and unleash the struggle for liberating the country from the Marxist yoke and for the restoration of order and the constitutional government.

3. The workers of Chile can rest assured that the economic and social achievements gained by now will not undergo considerable changes.

4. The press, radio stations, and TV channels of the Popular Unity block are to stop functioning from now on. Otherwise, they will be attacked from land and air.

5. The residents of Santiago must stay home in order to prevent the death of innocent people.

What distinguishes Pinochet's declarations from others is the laconicism typical of the Chilean army trained in the Prussian tradition. The Chilean coup is also different in that it not only restored the freshly upset rules of the market economy, but gave the market even greater freedom. As a rule, generals fall for nationalization in an attempt to base their military might on material foundation. When Brazil was ruled by the military its state sector accounted for one third of the country's economy, and in that situation the generals found it easier to dictate their will to the country.

The Brazilian publicist Genival Rabelo explained to me that generals are attracted by the power, the ability to get rich and the desire to get a new social status.

However, when they become governors and heads of universities and companies they are rarely able to resist the temptation of taking bribes, which does not prevent them from brandishing the weapon of morality and aiming it at the most vulnerable spots of democracy – its tolerance for weakness and obscenities.

The military coup in Brazil was an unpleasant surprise for my fellow candidate for a degree. As for the Brazilian people, they were expecting it, just like the Chileans expected Pinochet's coup. Some of them waited with a feeling of doom, others – indifferently, and still others – with a malicious impatience. And those in the last group were not as few as one would like to believe.

Vitaly Sobolev



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

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